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This paper aims at identifying relevant indicators for TFP growth in EU coun-
tries during the recovery phase following the 2008/09 economic crisis. We
proceed in three steps: First, we estimate TFP growth by means of Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA). Second, we perform a TFP growth decomposition
in order to get measures for changes in technical progress (CTP), technical
efficiency (CTE), scale efficiency (CSC) and allocative efficiency (CAE). And
third, we use BART – a non-parametric Bayesian technique from the realm
of statistical learning – in order to identify relevant predictors of TFP and its
components from the Global Competitiveness Reports.
We find that only a few indicators prove to be stable predictors. In par-
ticular, indicators that characterize technological readiness, such as broad-
band internet access, are outstandingly important in order to push technical
progress while issues that describe innovation seem only to speed up CTP in
higher-income economies.
The results presented in this paper can be guidelines to policymakers as
they identify areas in which further action could be taken in order to increase
economic growth. Concerning the bigger picture, it becomes obvious that
advanced machine learning techniques might not be able to replace sound
economic theory but they help separating the wheat from the chaff when it
comes to selecting the most relevant indicators of economic competitiveness.
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1 Introduction
The search for the determinants of economic prosperity has a long tradition in the eco-
nomic literature as politicians around the world are interested in knowing which levers
to move in order to make their economies flourish. In this paper, we investigate the
determinants that enable economies in the European Union (EU) to use their means
of production efficiently. Achieving high scores in the identified determinants shall be
rendered competitiveness.
Competitiveness seems an iridescent concept that has become a catch-all term for a
wide range of economic concepts. The World Economic Forum (2017, p. 11) defines
competitiveness as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level
of productivity of an economy”. This definition is appealing as it relates to productivity
as a well-defined concept that measures output per unit of input. Hence – and contrary to
the view by Krugman (1994) – competitiveness in this sense does not equal productivity
but is assumed to work as a pre-condition for productivity.
The World Economic Forum provides comprehensive suggestions concerning “the set of
institutions, policies and factors” in its annual Global Competitiveness Reports. The most
recent report includes 141 economies and monitors no less than 103 individual indicators.
Countries like Switzerland, Singapore or the United States are usually among the top
performers while many African countries are to be found at the bottom of the table.
One can easily argue against such indicator systems as they are fuzzy, hardly complete
and often lack a sound theoretical concept (see, e. g., Lall (2001) for a comprehensive
critique of the Global Competitiveness Report); but even if the rankings and the weighting
schemes might be somewhat ad hoc, such systems still are an inexhaustible source of
indicators of which some might well be associated with an efficient functioning of an
economy (even though others or even most of them might not). The fact that those
indicator systems are potentially fuzzy is only natural because so is the concept of total
factor productivity (TFP), the most important (see, e. g., Easterly and Levine (2001))
but largely mysterious driver of GDP variations.
In this paper, we argue that a set of indicators which jointly make up for an economy’s
competitiveness can be related to TFP growth. We proceed in three steps: First, we esti-
mate TFP growth in the EU after the 2009 crisis using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Second, we decompose TFP growth into four components, namely changes in technical
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progress (CTP), in technical efficiency (CTE), in scale efficiency (CSC) and in allocative
efficiency (CAE). And finally, we aim to identify the determinants of TFP growth and
its four components by analyzing the indicators provided by the Global Competitiveness
Report using a non-parametric Bayesian approach from statistical learning.
The remainder of this article will be structured as follows: The literature review is
divided into two parts. The first part (subsection 2.1) describes how our study fits into
the literature on economic growth; the second part (subsection 2.2) discusses the channels
through which the competitiveness indicators might influence the way economies can
translate inputs into outputs. Section 3 gives details about the methodological approach
and describes the data. The results are shown in Section 4 and summarized in Section 5.
2 Literature
2.1 General overview
The literature relevant for our study can be roughly divided into two strands: The first
one tries to find the determinants of economic growth; the second one argues that such
determinants will not affect growth rates directly but via total factor productivity (TFP).
The first strand of literature is dedicated to the search for relationships between eco-
nomic outcomes – mostly GDP growth rates – and a wide range of potential determinants.
In contrast to the research that rests upon widely agreed production functions as in the
second strand (see further below), this research is mostly theory-free and purely data-
driven. As the authors are aware of the fact that available models can not explicitly
distinguish the importance of a wide range of variables, they have established Bayesian
estimation techniques as the standard in the field. The advantage of Bayesian methods
is that they do not require pre-built estimation set-ups claiming to be “true” models of
the matter at hand. They can deal with model uncertainty and give insights about what
variables should be included in explaining variations in economic outcomes. Among the
most famous works of this kind is certainly the one by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004): They
use a Bayesian approach in order to explain long-run growth in 88 countries using 67
variables. They find that, i. a., primary schooling, the prices of investment goods and
the initial income levels are strongly connected to growth rates; the authors interpret
the high impact of the last-mentioned as evidence for economic convergence. Fernan-
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dez et al. (2001) use a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach for 41 variables and
140 countries; they also find initial GDP to have a strong impact on long-run growth.
Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2016) revisit both of the works mentioned (and the data sets
they have used) and combine a BMA model with Latent Class Analysis (LCA) in order
to analyze joint inclusion patterns of variables. Further examples for Bayesian analyses
are Brock and Durlauf (2001), Durlauf et al. (2008), Moral-Benito (2012), Ley and Steel
(2009) or – for a regional application – Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011).
This first strand of literature gives valuable insights into the determinants of economic
growth but – as mentioned above – often rests upon methodological rather than economic
reasoning. Hence, the second strand of literature takes neoclassical growth theory as a
starting point. The aim is to isolate the contributions of direct production factors, such
as capital and labor, and attribute the remaining variation in GDP growth to TFP. The
results shed light on the proportions of economic growth that can be explained by mea-
surable determinants and the ones that elude further explanation as they are driven by
unobservable sources. Such exercises often reveal that TFP growth holds accountable for
a considerable share of GDP growth in many countries (see, i. a., Easterly and Levine
(2001), Baier et al. (2006), Islam et al. (2006) or Burda and Severgnini (2009)). Apply-
ing decomposition techniques – based on both parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA)) or non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)) frontier analysis – allow
to further disentangle TFP growth. Such analyses can be more detailed in terms of policy
recommendations as they manage to explain whether economies increase their (residual)
TFP growth due to, say, accelerated technical progress or technical efficiency. Such de-
composition exercises have been applied to individual industries (see, e. g., Kim and Han
(2001), See and Coelli (2013) or Laurenceson and O’Donnell (2014)) and also to national
economies (see, e. g., Färe et al. (1994) or Pires and Garcia (2012)).
In this article, we aim at picking the most interesting aspects of both strands of litera-
ture and thereby try to learn as much as possible about the composition of TFP growth
and their respective drivers. The paper closest to ours is probably the one by Danquah
et al. (2014) who also perform a TFP growth decomposition and apply a Bayesian ap-
proach in order to identify relevant indicators. They identify unobserved heterogeneity
and the initial GDP level as the main drivers of TFP growth, while other indicators, like,
e. g., trade openness or the consumption share, seem less important.
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We contribute to this kind of research in three ways: First, we deploy an SFA based
decomposition technique in order to disentangle TFP growth into as many components
as possible. In contrast to many DEA based studies, we will be able to investigate not
only changes in technical progress and technical efficiency but also in scale and allocative
efficiency. The parametric nature of SFA will allow to interpret the results against the
background of the growth accounting literature. Second, we introduce a new approach
from statistical learning (Bayesian additive regression trees (BART), see Chipman et al.
(2010)) to this kind of literature. In contrast to the widely deployed BMA exercises,
BART – as a non-parametric technique – is very flexible in terms of the functional form
of relationships and stable when it comes to multicollinearity. Finally, we use data for
the EU that covers the post 2008/09 crisis period. We are therefore able to analyze the
recovery process and its most important drivers. In order to form expectations about
how the indicators in the Global Competitiveness Reports influence variables of economic
performance – in particular TFP growth – we will review them in the following section.
2.2 Hypotheses and Descriptive Statistics
The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) includes twelve major areas (referred to as
“pillars”). The construction of the GCI changes over time so that comparisons between
years are difficult. We use here the historical data set (version 20180712 )1 that includes
consistent data between 2007 and 2017 and follows the GCI definition described by the
World Economic Forum (2017).
The twelve pillars are divided into three subgroups, which represent different stages
of development: Pillars 1 to 4 are labeled factor-driven. At this stage, an economy’s
competitiveness primarily rests on factors such as natural resources and cheap labor. The
second, efficiency-driven stage incorporates pillars 5 to 10 and builds on an increasingly
skilled labor force, a well-functioning, large market and technological readiness. The third
stage is innovation-driven and requires highly sophisticated business practices (pillar 11)
and the ability to innovate (pillar 12). In order to compute the individual country scores,
the three subgroups are weighted depending on a country’s respective development stage.
The report combines data from international organizations, such as the World Bank and
1 http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/downloads/
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS)
conducted by the World Economic Forum (2017).
The GCI pillars are formulated in such a way, that higher scores are always “better”;
hence, we would expect positive signs for each one of them when regressed on any measure
of economic development. The methodological challenge will be to disentangle the effects
from one another and to find the indicators that affect TFP growth the most. The
following section will provide some economic reasoning for the channels through which
each of the pillars might affect a country’s economic performance.
2.2.1 1st Pillar: Institutions
Sound institutions facilitate transactions and help reducing production costs and uncer-
tainty. Institutions are – according to North (1990, p. 3) – “the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interac-
tion.” Formal institutions, such as laws or contracts, are defined by official authorities,
while informal institutions are usually unwritten sets of habits, customs or traditions.
The GCI pillar institutions is composed of 21 indicators for both public and private in-
stitutions, including the protection of property rights, the strength of investor protection,
the efficiency of the legal framework in settling disputes and the occurrence of irregular
payments and bribes. Most of those indicators are sourced from the EOS. As the box
plot in Figure 1 shows, the best performing EU country during our observation period
between 2009 and 2017 is Finland with an average score of 6.1; Bulgaria is at the bottom
of the EU table with an average of 3.4.
Figure 1
Institutions (1st Pillar)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Venezuela
2.27 (-0.21)
Bulgaria
3.36 (+0.29)
Finland
6.07 (+0.11)
Singapore
6.07 (-0.06)
Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
North (1987) states that complex economic structures and the trend towards special-
ization and division of labor lead to a growing importance of low transaction costs and
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confidence in contract enforcement. Acemoglu et al. (2005) also elaborate on how uncer-
tainty about the observance of contracts and insecure property rights reduce incentives
to invest and innovate.
A substantial empirical literature has examined and confirmed a tight relationship be-
tween institutions and economic variables such as GDP growth and productivity: Rodrik
et al. (2004) identify institutions as a major contributing factor of income levels around
the world, making use of a composite indicator that includes the protection of property
rights and the strength of the rule of law. Knack and Keefer (1995) analyze the impact of
property rights on economic growth and investment. They find that the security of prop-
erty rights affects the extent of investment as well as the efficiency of allocation of inputs.
Coe et al. (2009) report that a strong patent protection is a significant determinant of
TFP. They assume that the benefits of better institutions become effective through the
channel of incentives for R&D spending. Égert (2016) analyzes 34 OECD countries and
also observes that a higher rule of law and better law enforcement increase the effect of
R&D on TFP. Hall and Jones (1999) find that institutions and government policies are
the main driver of differences in capital accumulation and productivity. Mauro (1995)
uses indicators of subjective indices of bureaucratic honesty and efficiency and finds that
corruption leads to lower investment and consequently lowers economic growth. The
empirical results by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) point out that institutional quality has
a major influence on the capital-output ratio and the average level of human capital
but not on TFP. According to them, institutional quality works through the channel of
capital accumulation. Chong and Calderón (2000) conduct a causal analysis to study
whether institutional quality affects economic growth or vice versa. Their results indicate
that institutional reforms need a long time to become effective and that in particular
less developed countries benefit from institutional reforms; they also find some evidence
that economic growth may lead to an improvement of institutions. The empirical results
by Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that human capital leads to improvements of institutions
which in turn foster economic development. Acemoglu et al. (2014) react to these findings
and confirm their own previous results that institutions are the real driver of economic
development.
Since institutions in the EU are highly developed in comparison to other parts of the
world and as there is only little variation over time, we do not expect this pillar to be
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a major predictor of TFP growth in the EU. Also, any improvements would need a long
time to become effective (see, e. g., Chong and Calderón (2000)); hence, our feasible
observation period would probably be too short to find any effects.
2.2.2 2nd Pillar: Infrastructure
Electricity, telecommunication, water and transport infrastructure are used as inputs in
most production processes. Good infrastructure reduces transport times and production
costs, facilitates technology diffusion, the mobility of labor, plays a key role for trade and
even impacts location decisions of households and firms.
The GCI pillar infrastructure consists of nine indicators, whereby the focus is on quality
based on the EOS. Among the quantitative indicators are available airline seat kilometers,
mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions and fixed-telephone lines. The highest average
score in the EU holds Germany with 6.2, the lowest score has Romania with 3.4 (see
Figure 2). In Germany and other EU15 countries, the indicator has decreased; some of
the new members, however, have made major improvements, e. g. Poland with +1.8.
Figure 2
Infrastructure (2nd Pillar)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Haiti
1.81 (–)
Romania
3.41 (+1.15)
Germany
6.25 (-0.62)
Hong Kong SAR
6.69 (+0.16)
Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
The main mechanisms through which infrastructure affects productivity are included
in models of the New Economic Geography (see, e. g., Krugman (1991b) or Fujita et al.
(1999)): A reduction of time and transport costs results in a higher productivity of
intermediates, increases trading activities and enables a better access to larger markets,
which in turn helps to take advantage of scale economies, and causes greater competition.
Aschauer (1989) initiated a debate on the relationship between public spending on
infrastructure and productivity. He identified a positive relationship between the public
capital stock on core infrastructure and TFP with high returns to public infrastructure
investments. Since then, contradictory results have been found concerning the effects of
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infrastructure on economic growth and productivity. This is due to the fact that different
types of infrastructure have been investigated and that various methods of measurement
and models have been applied (see, e. g., Välilä (2020)). While Aschauer (1989) used
the public capital stock and public expenditures for measuring infrastructure, Égert et al.
(2009) argue that – especially in the EU – privatization and market liberalization make
them unreliable measures of infrastructure. Calderón et al. (2015) take the same view
and emphasize the importance of institutions in this context. Poor institutions and the
resulting inefficient spending or even corruption can hinder infrastructural development
(see also Esfahani and Ramírez (2003)). This is why public spending alone is not a good
proxy for infrastructure. Accordingly, Gramlich (1994) considers the results presented by
Aschauer (1989) implausibly high.
Using physical measures for infrastructure, Calderón et al. (2015) conclude that nei-
ther the level of development nor the level of infrastructure has an effect on the output
elasticity of infrastructure. This result is in contrast to other studies that find higher
impacts for countries with lower levels of infrastructure. Röller and Waverman (2001),
for instance, identify higher effects of telecommunication infrastructure on growth for
OECD countries than for non-OECD, arguing that a critical mass for telecommunication
is needed for positive effects. However, at the margin, investments in infrastructure may
not be productive, as shown by Fernald (1999) for road investments. He argues that a
second identical road network would not lead to productivity growth. A panel analysis
by Canning and Pedroni (2008) shows as well that infrastructure long-run effects on per
capita income vary across countries and types of infrastructure, since some countries are
above and others below their optimum level of infrastructure. Melo et al. (2013) conduct
a meta-analysis of 33 studies and conclude that productivity effects of roads seem to be
higher than of other transport modes and that the productivity effect of roads seems to
be higher for the U.S. economy than in European countries. Calderón and Servén (2004)
take both quantity and quality of infrastructure into account and find that the quantity
of infrastructure has a positive effect on long-run economic growth, while the relationship
between quality and growth is empirically less robust.
In recent years, an increasing number of empirical studies in regional, spatial, urban
and transportation economics can be observed (see, e. g., Bronzini and Piselli (2009),
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012), or Farhadi (2015)). Also, as endorsed by Redding
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and Turner (2014), causal analyses using different types of IV approaches have become
more important (see, e. g., Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), Baum-Snow et al. (2017),
Hornung (2015) or Ghani et al. (2016)).
Since the quantity of infrastructure seems to be more important than its quality (see,
e. g., Calderón and Servén (2004)), but the focus of this pillar is on quality, we do not
expect it to be a major predictor of TFP growth in the EU.
2.2.3 3rd Pillar: Macroeconomic Environment
The macroeconomic environment represents the overall state of an economy and provides
the framework within which all entities operate. It defines how economic decisions are
made both by consumers and companies. According to Fischer (1993), a stable macroeco-
nomic environment relies on, first and foremost, a predictable and low inflation rate and
a sustainable and stable fiscal policy. Economic stability and predictability, in particular,
are considered drivers of investments and productivity.
Accordingly, the GCI pillarmacroeconomic environment captures budget balances, pub-
lic debts and gross national savings. It also includes credit ratings and inflation rates. As
shown in Figure 3, Luxembourg achieves the highest score in the EU (6.1) while Greece
– shaken by the 2008/09 crisis – is only slightly above the global minimum.
Figure 3
Macroeconomic Environment (3rd Pillar)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Malawi
2.87 (-0.98)
Greece
3.26 (-0.32)
Luxembourg
6.11 (+0.33)
Norway
6.48 (+0.70)
Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
Government spending has an impact on how an economy develops and can be impor-
tant in times of crisis. A countercyclical fiscal policy might offset at least parts of the
recessionary impact on an economy. However, the scientific results on deficit spending are
rather mixed (see, e. g., Atoyan et al. (2012), Jha et al. (2014) or Guerguil et al. (2017)).
In any case, however, deficit spending will increase public debt which, if it gets out of
hand, could lead to a decreased financial and political independence. Many studies raise
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concerns about excessive debts leading to distrust in the ability of governments to meet
financial obligations and point towards negative effects of high public debt-to-GDP ratios
on growth (see, e. g., Baum et al. (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Diamond (1965),
Saint-Paul (1992) or Bohn (2011)). Another factor to consider is how the debts are com-
posed. Afonso and Jalles (2013), for instance, investigate debt maturity (short-term or
long-term debt above five years) and find a positive correlation between the maturity of
sovereign debts and economic growth in OECD countries. In other words, longer average
maturity appears to positively affect growth. Moreover, some literature suggests that
the impact on the national economy is worse if the debt is owed to foreigners (foreign
governments, private lenders or organizations), due to the fact that they cannot be taxed
by the respective government (see, e. g., Gros (2013) or Doğan and Bilgili (2014)).
A high government debt ratio combined with a general doubt about a country’s solvency
may also cause a downgrade in sovereign credit ratings. Such downgrades could result in
a bond and stock market downturn as well as a loss in value of a country’s currency (see,
e. g., Afonso et al. (2014) or Brooks et al. (2004)). Chen et al. (2016) investigate the impact
of changes in credit ratings on economic growth and find that upgrades/downgrades may
increase/decrease GDP growth via capital flows and interest rates.
Another crucial component of the macroeconomic framework is inflation. The relation
between inflation and growth has been subject of controversial debates. A substantial
number of studies on the matter, for instance by Mundell (1965) or Fischer (1993), agree
that high inflation is not compatible with sustained growth. However, the empirical
evidence is not as conclusive as often presented. Empirical studies, such as those by
Fischer (1993) or Omay and Kan (2010), often discover a nonlinear relationship between
inflation and growth. The effect on growth rates appears to depend on the rate of inflation.
Clear negative effects on growth and investment, Barro (1995) suggests, might be limited
to countries with exceedingly high inflation rates over a period of time. Moderate inflation
does not appear to have a notable impact. Bruno and Easterly (1998) find no evidence of
inflation having a long-term negative effect on growth: While inflation strongly impacts
economic growth during a high inflation crisis, they argue, growth rates tend to recover
quickly afterwards. According to the World Economic Forum (2019), inflation by itself is
not the main concern, but price volatility and uncertainty, as those have a considerable
effect on investment decisions. In accordance with previous research, several more recent
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studies agree on negative ramifications of inflation rates above a certain threshold (see,
e. g., Omay and Kan (2010) or Drukker et al. (2005)).
As this pillar might well contain important prerequisites of economic development, we
expect it to be a relevant predictor of TFP growth in EU countries.
2.2.4 4th Pillar: Health and Primary Education
The GCI places health and primary education in one pillar as both of them are among
the most basic preconditions for an economy. A healthy working population is crucial for
productivity as high absenteeism causes considerable costs and often results in decreasing
efficiency and overall productivity. Furthermore, high prevalence rates of chronic diseases
may also lead to lower labor force participation. The quality of primary education, in
turn, is essential to allow access to any qualifications needed in the labor market.
The GCI pillar health is composed of eight indicators. Most of them measure the
prevalence and business impact of diseases like tuberculosis and malaria. Although these
indicators have a strong bearing on the competitiveness of poorer countries they are rather
uncommon in most parts of Europe. Therefore, the focus of this section will be on life
expectancy. In terms of primary education, the GCI focuses on the quality of primary
education (based on the EOS) and primary education enrollment.
Figure 4 shows the average scores between 2009 and 2017. Finland heads the global
ranking with an average score of 6.8; Romania achieved 5.6. The plot demonstrates a
comparatively high standard of public health and primary education in the entire EU.
Figure 4
Health and Primary Education (4th Pillar)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Nigeria
3.02 (+0.03)
Romania
5.55 (-0.02)
Finland
6.80 (+0.43)
Finland
6.80 (+0.43)
Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
A classic approach to the economic impact of education has been offered by human
capital theory, which was pioneered by the works of Mincer (1958), Schultz (1961) and
Becker (1962). Human capital theory postulates that investing in human capital leads to
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a more productive workforce with a better set of skills, abilities etc. and subsequently, a
higher individual income. The theory has come under criticism for falling short to explain
wage and productivity differences. Despite the emergence of alternative approaches, for
instance by Spence (1973), human capital theory remains a cornerstone of research on the
economic effects of schooling.
More recent studies on the topic tend to focus on more specific aspects, such as the
importance of qualitative schooling, which is usually measured by comparing test scores.
Quality of education, some stress, contributes more to economic growth than the sheer
years of schooling (see, e. g. Hanushek and Kimko (2000), Hanushek and Wößmann
(2007) or Barro (2013)). Research also suggests a clear link between educational quality
and individual income (see, e. g. Murnane et al. (2000) or Hanushek and Wößmann
(2007)). Due to increasing global competition, Sahlberg (2006) urges schools to further
embrace a culture of flexibility, creativity, risk-taking and networking.
An analysis by Papageorgiou (2003) on the contribution of human capital accumulation
to economic growth explicitly differentiates between primary and post-primary education
and finds that the major role of basic education lies in the “production of final output”
(Papageorgiou, 2003, p. 622). Hence, primary education simply enters a country’s produc-
tion function as an input for the production of end products, while secondary and tertiary
education are seen as contributors to the development of innovative ideas as well as the
adoption and advancement of technology. While widespread primary education is cer-
tainly a prerequisite of competitiveness and therefore productivity, further improvements
will most likely not affect the performance of high-tech oriented economies.
The second part of the pillar is dedicated to health. A common indicator of health
is life expectancy. Higher life expectancy combined with lower fertility rates lead to a
lasting transformation of the age structure in many developed countries, which could
result in a decline in productivity due to lower labor market participation (see, e. g.,
Gordon (2017) or Baumgartner et al. (2006)). Interestingly, however, some studies find
no negative impact of aging on GDP growth (see, e. g., Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017)).
Cuaresma et al. (2014) try to assess the long-run effect of prospective aging on income
dynamics in Europe. The results differ across countries and suggest a stronger negative
effect for poorer countries. Prettner (2013) even shows that the positive effect of longevity
outweighs the impact of a falling birth rate. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) provide a
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possible explanation: They conclude that ongoing automation might be the prime reason
for their findings. Though the authors do not claim to have causal evidence, they argue for
a balancing effect of robots on economic growth, especially in more developed countries.
Due to the strong focus of this pillar on diseases that are comparably uncommon in
the EU, along with the rather high public health and primary education standards, we
do not expect this pillar to be a major predictor for TFP growth in EU countries.
2.2.5 5th Pillar: Higher Education and Training
While basic education primarily enters the production process, higher education makes
a substantial contribution to innovation and technology, as Papageorgiou (2003) notes.
A pool of well-educated and skilled individuals is a vital condition for conducting R&D.
This includes secondary and tertiary education as well as vocational training.
The respective GCI pillar consists of eight indicators including secondary and tertiary
education enrollment rates, the overall quality of the education system with a special focus
on math and science as well as management schools and internet access in schools. Voca-
tional training enters the pillar with another two indicators: the availability of specialized
training services and the extent of staff training.
Figure 5 shows the data. Finland reaches the top score worldwide (6.1), while Bul-
garia marks the lowest value in the EU (4.4). As for primary education and health (see
subsection 2.2.4), the EU maintains high scores compared to the rest of the world.
Figure 5
Higher Education and Training (5th Pillar)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Angola
2.01 (–)
Bulgaria
4.35 (+0.51)
Finland
6.14 (+0.21)
Finland
6.14 (+0.21)
Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
Researchers usually explain the effect of higher education based on human capital accu-
mulation (see, e. g., Temple (1999), Barro (2001), Papageorgiou (2003) or Abu-Qarn and
Abu-Bader (2007)). The endogenous growth model as proposed by Romer (1990) pro-
vides insight into the relationship between human capital and economic growth. Within
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this model, human capital – measured by the years of schooling and vocational training
– defines the speed of technological progress, as a large and well-educated work force is
presumed to be more capable to perform thorough research, create innovative production
techniques as well as new products and product variations. Technological progress, in
turn, is seen as a key facilitator of growth. Several authors in the field have built upon
Romer (1990) and stressed the crucial role of human capital (see, e. g., Lucas (1988), Ben-
habib and Spiegel (1994) or Barro (2013)). Some have also emphasized its importance
for the diffusion of new technologies as a highly educated workforce is more likely to be
able to absorb the latest advancements from technologically advanced countries (see, e. g.,
Barro (2013) or Papageorgiou (2003)).
Some researchers, however, stress that post-secondary education – simply measured in
years of schooling or the number of graduates – will not inevitably lead to a growing
economy. Hanushek (2016), for instance, highlights that increasing the quantity of higher
education only leads to more growth if it comes with improved cognitive skills. He recom-
mends a stronger focus on the quality of education instead of simply adding years. Similar
recommendations have been put forward for primary education (see subsection 2.2.4).
As higher education is a major precondition for R&D and/or the adoption of new
technologies, we expect this pillar to be a relevant predictor for TFP growth in the
advanced, innovation-driven EU economies.
2.2.6 6th Pillar: Goods Market Efficiency
Well-functioning goods markets ensure efficient production and trade. Countries establish
efficient goods markets by choosing the right degree of competition and market access
regulation. They also set incentives to invest and to maintain the confidence of both
investors and consumers.
The GCI pillar goods market efficiency is composed of 16 indicators, combining several
topics. It includes, i. a., barriers to market entry measured by the required procedures
and time to start a business, indicators for the measurement of domestic and foreign
competition, and the prevalence of foreign ownership. Figure 6 shows that the EU country
with the highest average score is Luxembourg (5.4), while Croatia comes off worst (3.9).
Product market regulations affect the costs to enter a market and the degree of com-
petition (see, e. g., Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)). Djankov et al. (2002) investigate 85
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Figure 6
Goods Market Efficiency (6th Pillar)
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Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
countries and find that market entry is expensive in most of them and that higher barri-
ers of entry are associated with a higher degree of corruption and an informal economy;
hence, they can lead to inefficient rent-seeking. At the same time, countries with heavier
regulations do not produce a higher quality of private or public goods. The findings by
Coe et al. (2009) indicate that countries with a high ease of doing business are associated
with higher levels of TFP. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find in their analysis of 23 in-
dustries in 18 OECD countries a positive relationship between market entry liberalization
and TFP growth in all observed countries.
With every successful market entry, rivalry between suppliers increases. Vickers (1995)
mentions three mechanisms to explain how stronger competition can lead to higher pro-
ductivity: It forces companies to produce more efficiently, it allocates production to the
most efficient companies and provides innovation incentives. At some point, however,
competition might lead to a decrease in productivity growth as it diminishes post-entry
rents and thereby discourages innovations (see, e. g., Aghion et al. (2005)).
The empirical literature finds mostly positive effects of competition: Holmes and Schmitz
(2010) review a series of studies on changes in competitive environments in industries; al-
most all of these studies conclude that an increase in competition results in productivity
growth. Buccirossi et al. (2013) find in their empirical analysis for twelve OECD coun-
tries a positive relationship between competition policy and TFP growth. Fernandes et al.
(2018) look at the effect of firm entry deregulation in Portugal, where a program (“On the
Spot Firm”) was introduced in 2005 in order to reduce bureaucracy to register a new busi-
ness. According to their findings, this program led to an increase in firm creation across
industries and municipalities. Égert (2016) identifies for a panel of OECD countries for a
period of three decades a negative association between anti-competitive product market
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regulations and TFP levels. Nickell (1996) finds some evidence of a positive link between
competition and TFP growth in the UK manufacturing sector. His conjecture is, however,
that growing competition does not raise the efficiency of firms, but allows many firms to
operate in the market, of which only the best survive in the long run.
Aghion et al. (2005) show that the relationship between competition and innovation is
complex. They develop a model that predicts the effect of product market competition
on innovation and find an inverted U-shape relationship. They explain their findings by
the fact that depending on the market situation, competition can encourage or discourage
firms to innovate. If two or more competitors are level with each other, competition will
animate them to innovate with the aim to outperform their rivals (“escape competition
effect”). In contrast, in industries with a higher technological gap, increased product
market competition may deter innovation by laggard companies since their expected profit
from catching-up with the technological leader decreases with the intensity of competition
(“Schumpeterian effect”). Griffith et al. (2010) confirm the escape competition effect in
their empirical analysis of the introduction of the EU Single Market Programme (SMP).
Finally, the prevalence of foreign ownership can be a decisive factor for innovation
activities and thus productivity, as stated by Guadalupe et al. (2012). They show for
Spanish manufacturing companies that foreign owners acquire only the most productive
firms and invest more in innovation, machinery and new organization structures than
firms that stay domestic. The authors suggest that foreign ownership gives a firm access
to larger markets and therefore incentives to innovate. Furthermore, knowledge spillovers
through foreign-owned establishments may raise TFP, as stated by Haskel et al. (2007).
As this pillar involves aspects that influence productivity in various ways, it is hard to
derive a hypothesis about TFP growth. A positive effect seems reasonable, though.
2.2.7 7th Pillar: Labor Market Efficiency
Efficient labor markets allow the optimal allocation of labor. Ideally, productivity is
boosted by matching workers with a fitting position in a swift and cost-efficient manner,
especially in the face of rapidly changing market conditions. A highly flexible labor market
would be able to respond to changing requirements with minimum cost and effort and
provide the required resilience to external shocks (see, e. g., Chen et al. (2003)).
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Accordingly, the GCI pillar labor market efficiency is measured by taking a look at the
allocation of workers. Indicators include, i. a., cooperation in labor-employer relations,
flexibility of wage determination, hiring and firing practices, redundancy costs, effects of
taxation on incentives to work, pay and productivity, and female labor force participation.
Furthermore, it rates a country’s capacity to attract and retain talented workers.
The most efficient labor market in the EU is that of the UK with a score of 5.3 (see
Figure 7). With a score of 3.6, Italy is located at the bottom of the EU table.
Figure 7
Labor Market Efficiency (7th Pillar)
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Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
Many authors have emphasized the need for flexible labor markets, which are often
considered a necessary requirement for competitiveness (see, e. g., Bentolila and Bertola
(1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Nickell (1997), Fitoussi et al. (2000) or, more
recently, Cunat and Melitz (2012)). Too much regulation, many argue, often leads to a
decrease in overall productivity as well as higher unemployment. Hamermesh and Trejo
(2000), for instance, show that the labor demand for overtime hours decreases when a high
penalty is introduced. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) particularly stress the importance of
hiring and firing practices. High firing costs, they conclude, constrain a firm’s flexibility
to adapt to changes. They might also be detrimental to innovation, Saint-Paul (1997)
argues, as countries with high firing costs tend to focus on mature rather than new
products in order to increase job security. Moreover, Haaland and Wooton (2007) show
how country differences in hiring and firing costs strongly affect the investment decisions
of multinational enterprises and therefore a country’s capacity to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI).
A flexible labor market goes hand in hand with the flexibility of wage determination.
In this context, Nickell (1997) emphasizes the crucial role of labor unions, which indicate
the degree to which wages are negotiated collectively. Strong unions are seen as a feature
18
of an inflexible labor market and often raise unemployment. However, Nickell (1997)
summarizes, the repercussions are negligible if wage negotiations are well coordinated with
employers. Pissarides (1998) argues for unemployment benefits to be indexed to wages, as
it helps to ensure wage flexibility and the absorption of the effects of tax changes. Higher
prospective unemployment benefits, Burda et al. (2016) add, also lead to shirking and
thereby to reduced productivity.
The focus on a deregulated labor market, however, is not undisputed. Labor market reg-
ulations do play a crucial role, as they moderate certain forms of rigidities, such as power
inequalities and information asymmetries (see, e. g., Gruber (2004)). Effective labor mar-
ket policies and some cooperation in labor-employer relations could help to balance those
inequalities. Active labor market policies, Boeri and Burda (1996) find, also enhance the
job matching process. This is a crucial issue as job reallocation can be time-consuming
and resource-intensive, which is captured in the renowned model of equilibrium unem-
ployment and job matching by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Similarly, Acemoglu
and Shimer (2000) draw attention to the positive effects of unemployment insurance on
productivity: Workers who benefit from moderate insurance in case of unemployment are
more likely to take the time to search for better-paid jobs that match their qualification,
which in turn encourages employers to create these jobs.
Another aspect of a competitive labor market is its openness towards women. Although
the correlation between female labor force participation and GDP has been subject to
controversial discussions, the vast majority of researchers agree on a long-term positive
impact on economic growth (see, e. g, Çağatay and Özler (1995), Gaddis and Klasen
(2014) or Lechman and Kaur (2015)).
As some of the indicators in this pillar directly relate to labor productivity, we expect
it to be a considerable predictor for TFP growth in the EU.
2.2.8 8th Pillar: Financial Market Development
A well-functioning financial market helps reducing transaction and information costs. It
needs policies and institutions that allow the efficient allocation of capital. The GCI pillar
financial market development includes eight indicators and contains, i. a., the availability
and affordability of financial services for businesses, indicators for the stability of the
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financial sector, and an indicator that measures the degree of legal protection of borrowers’
and lenders’ rights. Seven of these indicators stem from the EOS.
In the EU, the average score for this pillar varies between 3.1 for Greece and 5.5 for
Finland as depicted in Figure 8. The scores deteriorated in many EU countries after the
2009 crisis; the decline was particularly high in Greece and Cyprus.
Figure 8
Financial Market Development (8th Pillar)
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Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
King and Levine (1993b) stress four types of mechanisms through which financial mar-
kets affect productivity: The first one is to make capital available to entrepreneurs in
order to convert their inventions into innovation. However, innovation activities are asso-
ciated with uncertainty. Financial institutions help to diversify risks, which is the second
mechanism. Third, financial institutions evaluate entrepreneurs and provide resources to
the most productive ones. As this evaluation entails high fixed costs, it should be car-
ried out by specialized organizations. The fourth channel refers to the ability of financial
institutions to estimate the expected profits from innovations.
Many authors (e. g. King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine and Zervos (1998), Beck et al.
(2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), Calderón and Liu (2003), Levine (2004) or Madsen
and Ang (2016)) conclude that financial market development boosts economic growth.
King and Levine (1993a) find a set of indicators for financial development to have positive
effects on growth, the efficiency of capital allocation and the rate of physical capital
accumulation. Beck et al. (2000) show that financial intermediary development affects
economic growth mainly via its positive effect on resource allocation and thus TFP growth.
However, not all authors take the positive effects of financial market development on
economic development as proven. Calderón and Liu (2003), for instance, identify a bidi-
rectional causality: The impact of financial development on TFP growth is stronger in
developing countries than in industrial economies, whereas the reverse relationship is
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stronger for the latter. Zang and Kim (2007) find no evidence of causal effects of financial
services on economic growth. However, they identify effects in the opposite direction and
argue that a growing economy fosters greater demand for financial services.
According to Arestis and Demetriades (1997), institutional structures and governance
of financial systems play a major role. Based on the example of Germany and the U.S.,
they show how different financial systems have varying effects on economic growth. Their
results mirror the findings by Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Arestis et al. (2001) or
Shan et al. (2001). De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) suggest that the relationship between
financial and economic development may vary across countries, stages of development and
over time. Rioja and Valev (2004) confirm a non-linear relationship. They show that only
in countries with intermediate levels of financial development, improvements will have a
large, positive effect on economic growth. In highly developed financial systems, the effect
is much smaller; the effects in countries with low levels of financial systems are unclear.
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) even find evidence for negative effects of financial
intermediation on economic growth in a sample of twelve Latin American countries from
1950-1985. They argue that the extreme financial liberalization with a poor regulatory
environment led to a collapse of financial markets in the region with negative effects
on the efficiency of investment. Ghani and Suri (1999) also conclude that the banking
sector can have negative effects on TFP growth. They show how rapidly growing bank
lending in Malaysia negatively influenced the project selection process, risk analysis and
monitoring. The consequence is that capital is allocated inefficiently. Also in Europe,
credit misallocation can cause TFP loss, as shown by Gopinath et al. (2017) for Spain,
Italy and Portugal. Acharya et al. (2019) observe that the prevalence of “zombie” firms
and “zombie” lending during the financial crisis was high in some Southern European
countries. According to them, credit misallocation through zombie lending can affect
non-zombie firms in various ways: First, due to problems of zombie firms to service their
debt, interest rates also grow for productive firms in the same industry. Second, zombie
firms artificially kept alive have adverse effects on market competition. Schivardi et al.
(2017) also explore the effects of credit misallocation on productivity during the financial
crisis. They observe for Italy that zombie firms survived better in the environment of
weaker banks while failures of healthy non-zombie firms simultaneously increased. Duval
et al. (2020) show that worsening credit conditions played a crucial role in the European
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financial crisis and led vulnerable firms to reduce their innovation activities and thus
affected TFP growth, especially in Southern Europe.
The relationship between financial and economic development is complex. As high
scores of this pillar can, nonetheless, be connected to inefficient lending – in particular
during the 2008/09 crisis in Southern Europe – we expect a negative relationship for those
countries but assume a positive association for the more developed ones.
2.2.9 9th Pillar: Technological Readiness
Technological readiness is considered a key factor for growth as economies are constantly
required to adapt in order to stay or become competitive in global markets (see, e. g.,
Romer (1990)). This pillar aims at capturing a country’s capacity for adopting existing
technologies in order to increase competitiveness.
The GCI pillar particularly focuses on the absorption of information and communi-
cation technologies (ICTs). The emphasis on ICTs is reflected by four indicators: the
percentage of internet users, fixed-broadband internet subscriptions, internet bandwidth
and mobile-broadband subscriptions. Other indicators measure the availability of the lat-
est technologies and the capacity of companies to absorb them. The pillar also includes
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the technology transfer expected to come with it.
As depicted in Figure 9, Sweden was the best performing country in the EU with an
average score of 6.2, while Romania only reached a score of 4.3. According to the data,
Central and Northern European countries have all performed comparably well in this area.
Figure 9
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Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
Technological progress is generally expected to foster productivity. ICTs, in particular,
are often presented as prerequisites of an efficient production process, facilitators of inno-
vation and, in turn, contributors to TFP (see, e. g., Pilat (2005)). The relation between
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technological change, often measured by ICTs, and productivity growth is complex and
has been subject of debates for decades. In his seminal paper, Solow (1957) analyzed
long-term growth in the U.S. between 1909 and 1949 and found that close to 90 % of
labor productivity growth could be traced back to technological advances. His analysis,
however, might have been built on data from a historically unique time period and have
led to findings that are not easily applicable to a different context. Solow (1987) himself
concluded that the emergence of computer technology can be seen “everywhere but in the
productivity statistics”. The resulting productivity paradox, also titled IT paradox, refers
to a neutral or negative impact of investments in ICTs on firm performance and was
affirmed by a number of studies (see, e. g., Berndt and Morrison (1995), Carr and Carr
(2004), Lee and Connolly (2010) or Gilbert Jr et al. (2012)). Various researchers, such
as Brynjolfsson (1993) and Crafts (2010), have challenged the validity of the productivity
paradox with respect to methods and data, measurement issues, mismanagement of new
technologies and the time lag between investment and measurable productivity growth.
Although initial effects tend to be rather small, several researchers indeed find positive
impacts of investing in technological innovations on firm-level performance and overall
productivity (see, e. g., Lichtenberg (1995), Gretton et al. (2004) or Crafts (2010)).
Although the availability of technological innovations is an essential precondition, it
alone does not guarantee a successful firm level absorption, which refers to the ability
to utilize, replicate and, if necessary, adapt external technologies. Sustained efforts and
considerable investments are required to allow for a sufficient diffusion and adoption of the
latest technologies. A variety of studies search for the conditions of an effective absorp-
tion (see, e. g., Qosasi et al. (2019), Boateng et al. (2011), Crafts (2010), Arogyaswamy
and Elmer (2005) or Cohen and Levinthal (1989)). Qosasi et al. (2019), who study the
capability of small businesses to use ICTs strategically, found that, above all, businesses
required a certain organizational flexibility and an entrepreneurial orientation to be able
to gain a competitive advantage. Moreover, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) stress that
the capacity to effectively absorb technologies depends, i. a., on a company’s R&D activ-
ities as they not only promote innovation, but also help firms to properly understand and
utilize external technologies.
Foreign direct investments (FDI) and the resulting technology transfers can also con-
tribute to technological readiness. Host countries anticipate long-term benefits from multi-
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national enterprises (MNEs) through knowledge and, in particular, technology spillovers
(see, e. g., Fu et al. (2011)). Spillovers often occur when multinationals share technolo-
gies with their foreign subsidiaries (see, e. g., Markusen (2002)) and interact with local
firms and customers (see, e. g., Javorcik (2004)). Goldberg et al. (2008) emphasizes
that investor-friendly policies might aid in maximizing technology transfers. Glass and
Saggi (1999) and Goldstein (2004), however, draw attention to the need to select policy
interventions very carefully and strategically when it comes to FDI, as they could also
exacerbate difficulties. Multinational companies and host countries may have diverging
interests (see, e. g., Fu et al. (2011)). According to van der Straaten et al. (2019), MNEs
tend to widen gender wage gaps in less-developed countries. They also shed light on the
importance for host countries to have a strong property rights protection, as it strongly
affects the behavior of MNEs in terms of wages.
Nevertheless, FDI are expected to lead to increased productivity and income growth
(see, e. g., Goldstein (2004), Javorcik et al. (2015) or Peluffo (2015)).
This pillar is related to innovation (see subsection 2.2.12 below). While innovation
might be important for economies near the technology frontier, backward countries might
benefit from increasing their absorption capacities first. Therefore, we expect technological
readiness to be a good predictor for TFP growth, especially in less developed EU countries.
2.2.10 10th Pillar: Market Size
The overall market size of a country is determined by its domestic market capacity and
its integration into the world economy. The size of a country (usually measured as a
combination of population, land area or GDP) comes with costs and benefits.
The GCI pillar market size contains only a few indicators: a domestic and a foreign
market size index, GDP in purchasing power parity and exports as a percentage of GDP.
Germany ranks first among the EU countries with an average score of 6.0 (see Figure 10);
Malta’s average of 2.5 is the lowest. It is not surprising that – contrary to other pillars –
the values of the pillar market size have remained mostly constant over time.
As noted by Alesina et al. (2005), larger countries have the advantage of lower per
capita costs for public goods and services. Such economies of scale are also assumed for
the private sector, especially the manufacturing sector (see, e. g., Krugman (1991b) or
MacDonald (1994)). Briguglio (1998) confirms this hypothesis empirically. According to
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Figure 10
Market Size (10th Pillar)
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Note: The plot shows average scores between 2009 and 2017 (and absolute changes in parentheses).
his results, there is a positive relationship between country size and increasing returns to
scale. Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) find positive effects of scale of production on average
labor productivity through the channel of TFP. In contrast, Bartelsman et al. (2013)
assume in their model slightly decreasing but almost constant returns to scale based on
the findings by, i. a., Syverson (2004).
Market size further influences productivity through the availability and the formation of
human capital. The restricted availability of working force can be a critical factor for small
countries. According to Romer (1990), a large population does not necessarily generate
higher economic growth; rather, the stock of human capital is important. In his model, the
integration into international markets with high human capital stocks can foster economic
growth. Armstrong and Read (2003) argue that – due to their disadvantages in scale
economies – small countries can not compete with larger countries in low skilled, labor-
intensive export sectors; this is why they have to specialize in higher value-added activities
with intensive use of human capital. Such specialization, however, might increase the
exposure to exogenous shocks (see, e. g., Armstrong and Read (2003)). Easterly and Kraay
(2000) confirm this empirically. Even though they do not find a significant difference in
economic growth between large and small countries, they observe that small ones are more
volatile than larger ones and are affected more by economic trade shocks.
Trade and market size often go hand in hand, but the findings concerning this relation-
ship are mixed. Trade increases competition which, in turn, is suggested as one of the
main mechanisms how market size can affect productivity. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
for example, predict that larger markets trigger tougher competition, with the conse-
quence that least productive firms exit the market. Thereby, resources are reallocated to
more productive firms, which in turn raises the aggregate level of efficiency. Moreover,
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Grossman and Helpman (1991) assign a major role to the integration into global markets,
arguing that it increases the exchange of information and makes spillover effects possible.
While Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) identify a positive effect of trade and population size
on TFP, the results by Badinger (2007) do not suggest that market size is related to
productivity effects of trade.
Rose (2006) argues that trade openness has a negative relationship with country size
and thus identifies trade openness as real determinant for economic outcomes, while he
identifies the country size as insignificant. Easterly and Kraay (2000) conclude as well
that small countries are more open to international trade, which in turn has positive
growth effects. Ramondo et al. (2016) emphasize that trade models often underestimate
domestic trade costs and that the consideration of this can weaken scale effects.
Market size also generates incentives for innovation, as shown by Acemoglu and Linn
(2004). Even after correcting for endogeneity issues (as better products find larger mar-
kets), they find a high effect of potential market size on innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry. They state that the driving forces behind innovation are profit incentives that
grow with market size. Other authors support the view that larger markets encourage
greater investment in innovation (see, e. g., MacDonald (1994) or Guadalupe et al. (2012)).
Briguglio (1998) and Armstrong and Read (2003) mention further disadvantages of
small countries that could hinder their productivity. Small countries usually have poor
natural resources, depend on imported technologies that are designed for larger produc-
tions, have limited connections to sea and air transport, have low domestic inter-industry
linkages and are dependent on imports for production inputs and final demand. They also
lack market power. On the other hand, it is assumed that social cohesion is stronger in
smaller countries, which Alesina et al. (2005) consider to be an advantage for a country’s
economic development. In very large countries, administrative costs might exceed the
benefits of size pointed out above.
All observed countries in our study are EU members (or joined the EU during the
observation period), ensuring them access to the single market. In 2019, only Ireland and
Cyprus exported more goods to partners outside the EU than inside (Eurostat (2020)).
Hence, as all countries face more or less the same market, we do not expect this pillar to
predict major differences in TFP growth in the EU.
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2.2.11 11th Pillar: Business Sophistication
According to the Global Competitiveness Report, business sophistication is of particular
importance for “countries at an advanced stage of development, when, to a large extent,
the more basic sources of productivity improvements have been exhausted” (World Eco-
nomic Forum, 2017, p. 319). Dima et al. (2018, p. 11) label business sophistication one
of the “soft” pillars, which are often related to the extent of R&D activities and, in turn,
enable efficiency and productivity improvements. Therefore, the final two pillars – busi-
ness sophistication and innovation (pillar 12) – are considered defining aspects for highly
developed economies at an innovation-driven stage of development.
The GCI approaches business sophistication by taking a look at existing business net-
works at the country-level as well as strategies and operations at the firm level. A set
of nine indicators, including the quantity and quality of local suppliers, evaluates how
well companies and industries are able to create clusters. This pillar also incorporates the
nature of competitive advantages, the length of value chains, the control of international
distribution and the sophistication of the overall production process. Further indicators
are added to capture the extent of marketing and the readiness to delegate authority.
Figure 11 depicts the average scores between 2009 and 2017. In the EU, the average
score varies between 5.7 for Germany and 3.6 for Romania.
Figure 11
Business Sophistication (11th Pillar)
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Globalization has given rise to a significant amount of literature dealing with the ques-
tion how to stay competitive in light of greater competition. According to, e. g., Porter
(1990) or Kaplinsky (2000), companies would be well-advised to focus on increasing the
efficiency of both production and internal processes, improving their products or shift-
ing attention to other aspects, such as design. In order to achieve these goals, some
researchers highlight the importance of strengthening local economic development, for
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instance by supporting the development of clusters. Geographical proximity of interact-
ing firms within and between industries has been much discussed, especially within the
framework of the New Economic Geography (starting with Krugman (1991a,b)). The
promotion of further cluster development might act as a foundation for countries to in-
crease productivity. Both local clusters as well as international linkages can be a source
of competitiveness. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002), for instance, analyze how clusters can
be integrated into global value chains.
By becoming part of a global value chain, local firms hope for opportunities to upgrade
by acquiring new skills, competences and knowledge that enable them to move to higher
value-added tasks within the chain (see, e. g., Henderson et al. (2002)). The definition
of upgrading differs in the literature, just like the expected value and limitations for
individual firms (for a critical discussion, see, e. g., Morrison et al. (2008)). Humphrey and
Schmitz (2002) distinguish between four different categories of upgrading: Moving towards
a technologically more advanced production process, shift to more complex products,
adopt new functions or drop unnecessary ones and/or moving into a new economic sector.
The authors also suggest that different types of relationships between actors within a
value chain (e. g. loose business connections, co-dependent networks or varying degrees of
hierarchies) also allow for different upgrading chances. Accordingly, Gereffi et al. (2005)
and Elola et al. (2013) stress that chain governance needs to be sensitive to the respective
relationships within a value chain and the upgrading prospects that come with it.
Other aspects of business sophistication are more concerned with professional manage-
ment at the firm level. Those include the high relevance of innovative marketing practices
(see, e. g., Gupta et al. (2016)). In a quantitative study on U.S. and European firms,
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) assess the impact of management practices on productiv-
ity. The findings suggest that high-quality management practices are strongly correlated
with a better overall performance, leading to, i. a., higher productivity and profitability.
Furthermore, business sophistication is frequently analyzed in combination with a coun-
try’s or a firm’s capacity to innovate. Razavi et al. (2012) use the GCI of 2011/12 to
investigate the link between innovation and business sophistication and find a significant
positive relation between these two pillars. Kirikkaleli and Ozun (2019) confirm the pos-
itive connection between business sophistication and innovation, along with benefits for
the macroeconomic environment.
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This pillar measures capabilities that are important for more developed economies. Due
to its “soft” nature, however, it is hard to formulate a clear hypothesis. If at all, it might
be able to predict TFP in more developed EU countries.
2.2.12 12th Pillar: Innovation
The last pillar of the GCI is dedicated to innovation. The implementation of new goods,
services and processes enables firms to produce more efficiently by reducing production
costs and to create and occupy new markets. As stated by Schumpeter (1961), the
incentive to innovate comes from the expectation of monopoly rents. However, uncertainty
is a major characteristic of innovation.
The GCI pillar innovation is composed of seven indicators (i. a. company spending on
R&D, availability of scientists and engineers and the number of patent applications under
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)) and includes various actors of innovation, such
as governments, companies, research institutions, universities and scientists. Most of the
indicators are based on the EOS.
As depicted in Figure 12, Finland achieves the highest average score (5.7) within the
EU; Bulgaria the lowest (3.0). Since 2009, most countries have improved their scores;
only five have declined (i. e. Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Hungary and Romania).
Figure 12
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Since the empirical studies by Griliches (1958) and Mansfield (1965), and the creation of
models of endogenous technological change (see, i. a., Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) or Aghion and Howitt (1992)), several studies have exam-
ined the link between innovation and productivity. In these models, profit incentives are
the driving force for technological progress. However, choosing the right indicators for the
measurement of innovation is challenging (see, e. g., Hall et al. (2013)). Mainly two mea-
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sures have been used to capture innovative activities: R&D expenditures as innovation
input and patent counts as innovation output.
Griffith et al. (2004) find that R&D expenditures foster productivity growth directly
through innovation and indirectly through technology transfer. Their results also suggest
that the further away a country is from the technological frontier, the higher are the rates
of productivity growth through R&D. Similarly, Coe et al. (2009) observe that domestic
and foreign R&D capital are key determinants of TFP. But their results do not confirm
the view that the distance to the frontier matters. More recently, Égert (2016) finds a
strong positive link between overall R&D spending and TFP. This positive effect is only
attributable to business funded R&D. Interestingly, R&D funded by the government has
no positive effects. These findings are consistent with the results by Coe et al. (2009) and
Pegkas et al. (2019); the latter find that business R&D expenditure has the highest positive
effect on innovation in EU countries. According to the results by Griffith et al. (2006),
however, central government funding for innovation projects increases the probability that
a firm becomes active in R&D at all.
Furman et al. (2002) examine factors that have a direct effect on international patent-
ing activities of foreign countries in the U.S. They identify various determinants of this
relationship and find that public policy (e. g. incentives for innovation through protection
of intellectual property, investment in human capital or creation of supportive environ-
ments for industrial clusters) affects R&D productivity. They state further that there has
been a slow but steady convergence among the observed countries regarding the measured
innovative capacity.
It must be noted in this context that innovation and its expected impact on productivity
are not only embedded in institutional environments, but also depend on macroeconomic
and sector-specific conditions (see, e. g., Furman et al. (2002), Scarpetta and Tressel
(2002), Coe et al. (2009), Ortega-Argilés et al. (2011) or Aghion et al. (2015)). Griffith
et al. (2006), for instance, explore the link between innovation and labor productivity for
manufacturing firms in France, Germany, Spain and the UK and find varying results in
those four countries. Furthermore, the type of innovation must be considered: Lee and
Kang (2007) examine Korean manufacturing firms and find that process innovation leads
to higher productivity in the short run while they expect product innovation to be more
important in the long run.
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Also, the stage of development plays a crucial role for the effect of innovation on pro-
ductivity. Most countries of the EU are – according to the Global Competitiveness Report
– innovation-driven or on their way from efficiency- to innovation-driven economies; only
Bulgaria is classified as efficiency-driven (see World Economic Forum (2017)). Innovation
and technological change are seen as drivers of productivity, particularly for innovation-
driven economies. According to Acemoglu et al. (2006), the closer a country gets to the
world technology frontier, the higher is the relative importance of innovation relative to
imitation. In contrast, the imitation of well-established technologies plays a more impor-
tant role for countries far below the frontier. The capability to do so is rather a question
of technological readiness (see pillar 9 in subsection 2.2.9). Accordingly, Akçomak and
Ter Weel (2009) suggest that backward economies should first invest in education and
only in a second step in R&D, since the private sector cannot invest efficiently in innova-
tion without the required social capital. Therefore, we expect the pillar innovation to be
a good predictor of TFP growth only in the higher-income economies in the EU.
3 Methodology
Our main aim is to identify the extent to which the twelve GCI pillars described in the
last section relate to TFP growth and its components. Hence, we want to distinguish not
only the speed at which TFP in a respective country has been growing in the aftermath of
the 2008/09 crisis but also why it has done so. Was a particular country successful due to
increased technical progress, has it learned to use its production factors more efficiently
or has it just moved towards the right mix of production factors or the optimal level of
output? And – in turn – why was it able to do so, i. e. what are the determinants of
technical progress, technical efficiency, scale efficiency and allocative efficiency?
In order to find answers to those questions, we will proceed in three steps: First,
we will estimate an aggregate production function using Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA). Second, we will use the SFA results to construct measures of TFP growth and its
four components (technical progress, technical efficiency, scale efficiency and allocative
efficiency). And finally, we will make use of a non-parametric modeling approach (BART
= Bayesian Additive Regression Trees) in order to identify the most relevant determinants
of TFP growth.
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3.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
Our TFP decomposition will be based on Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). SFA traces
back to the works by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977). It has
originally been developed for operations research purposes and has been used extensively
for the analysis of efficiency in agricultural production (see, e. g., Latruffe (2010) for
a survey). However, as firm-level production functions are reflected in macroeconomic
growth models, it seems straightforward to use SFA to analyze the economic performance
of regions (see, e. g., Chandra (2003, 2005) or Kluge (2018)) and even national economies
(see, e. g., Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) or Pires and Garcia (2012)).
We deploy Stochastic Frontier Analysis to a standard neoclassical production function:
Yi,t = f(Ki,t, Li,t,β) (1)
where Yi,t captures GDP in country i at time t,Ki,t is the net capital stock, Li,t measures
annual hours worked and β is a vector of elasticities. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean s.d. Min. Max.
GDP (in billions of e) 517.86 794.92 7.06 3,174.00
Annual hours worked (millions) 13,411.14 16,577.73 345.03 61,564.00
Net Capital Stock (in billions of e) 1,493.47 2,302.19 15.16 8,894.53
Adjusted wage share (as % of GDP) 52.66 5.15 35.20 63.78
Source: AMECO (as of 2nd July, 2020). n = 252, t = 9, Countries = 28
SFA assumes that the observational units produce less than they could due to random
output variations but also due to systematic deficiencies. The standard way to model
that (see, e. g., Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003)) is simply:
Yi,t = f(Ki,t, Li,t,β) · ξi,t · exp(υi,t) (2)
where ξi,t ∈ (0, 1] and υi,t is the remaining idiosyncratic error term. Assuming a translog
production function and setting ui,t = −ln(ξi,t) allows taking natural logs in order to reach
32
our final estimation equation:
ln(Yi,t) = β0,i + βn · t+ βk · ln(Ki,t) + βl · ln(Li,t)
+ 12 · βn · t
2 + 12 · βkk · ln(Ki,t)
2 + 12 · βll · ln(Li,t)
2
+ βkl · ln(Ki,t) · ln(Li,t) + βkn · ln(Ki,t) · t+ βln · ln(Li,t) · t+ υi,t − ui,t
(3)
The model is estimated via maximum likelihood. Distributional assumptions are re-
quired in order to identify ui,t and to distinguish it from υi,t. The idiosyncratic error term
υi,t is supposed to be normally distributed (N(0, συ)) while we assume the inefficiency
term to follow a truncated normal distribution (N+(µ, σ2u)) (with truncation point at 0).
It is possible to explicitly model the mean of the inefficiency term in order to estimate
how the supposed determinants of competitiveness correlate with higher or lower (in-
)efficiency scores. We include the twelve pillars from Section 2.2:
ui,t = δ0 +
12∑
p=1
δp · ln(Pillarp,i,t) + ωi,t (4)
Equations 3 and 4 should not be estimated sequentially in a two-stage approach as
econometric issues well-known in the SFA literature will arise (see, e. g., the comprehensive
explanation in Schmidt (2011)).2 We will avoid running into such problems by estimating
the entire model – i. e. the frontier part (see Equation 3) and the inefficiency part (see
Equation 4) – simultaneously as it is standard in the SFA literature. Hence, we make
sure that the model is estimated properly and that the derived TFP decomposition (see
next subsection) will be valid.
In the formulation above, the inefficiency term is treated as time-variant. In order to es-
timate Equation (3), we will deploy the so-called “true” fixed-effects estimator as proposed
by Greene (2005). This method solves an issue that is inherent to time-invariant panel
SFA models; namely that any time-invariant (unobserved) heterogeneity will inevitably
be absorbed by the inefficiency term. Hence, countries with large within-group variation
might be considered less efficient than they actually are. The “true” fixed-effects estimator
allows to identify the inefficiency term more precisely by making β0,i country-specific.
2 The first issue is that the frontier is not estimated properly when variables that have an influence on
ui,t enter the analysis only at the second stage. Hence, if such variables show significant effects on the
inefficiency term, they should have been included in the first stage. The otherwise resulting omitted
variable bias occurs regardless of how the frontier is modeled. Also, the effect of covariates on ui,t
will be underestimated and tests for δp = 0 are generally invalid in two-stage approaches of this kind.
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3.2 TFP decomposition
The results of our SFA exercise can now be used for a TFP decomposition. TFP growth
thus stems from four sources: changes in technical progress (CTP), technical efficiency
(CTE), scale efficiency (CSC) and allocative efficiency (CAE). Decomposition exercises
have become standard in the literature (see, e. g., Pires and Garcia (2012), Kim and Han
(2001) or Coelli et al. (2003)). There are slightly different approaches; we will stick to the
one in Coelli et al. (2003).3 TFP growth between periods 0 and 1 can be expressed as:
ln
(
TFPi,1
TFPi,0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFP growth
= 12 ·
( 1∑
t=0
∂ln(Yi,t)
∂t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CTP
+ ln
(
e−ui,1
e−ui,0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CTE
+ 12 ·
(( 1∑
t=0
St · εk,t
)
· (Ki,1 −Ki,0) +
( 1∑
t=0
St · εl,t
)
· (Li,1 − Li,0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSC
+ 12 ·
(( 1∑
t=0
λk,t − (1− cl,t)
)
· (Ki,1 −Ki,0) +
( 1∑
t=0
λl,t − cl,t
)
· (Li,1 − Li,0)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAE
(5)
where εk,t and εl,t are the derivatives of Equation 3 with respect to capital and labor,
St = (RSt − 1)/RSt with RSt = (εk,t + εl,t) and λkt = εkt/RSt resp. λlt = εlt/RSt. The
parameter cl,t captures the respective wage share.
Most analyses using TFP decomposition stop here as the reader will have learned
something about the speed and the sources of TFP growth in the sample of companies,
industries or countries under observation. This mere technical decomposition sheds light
into the fuzzy, “residual-like” concept of TFP. However, it still does not give answers
3 There are mainly two approaches: The one by Bauer (1990) and Kumbhakar et al. (2000) that is based
on total differentials and the one by Caves et al. (1982a,b) and Orea (2002) based on index numbers.
Coelli et al. (2003) argue that both tend to yield very similar results but the latter is better suited
for the matter at hand as time is measured on a discrete rather than on a continuous scale.
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about what actually drives TFP growth and what policies would make economies flourish.
Going one step further and investigating the determinants of TFP growth (and its four
ingredients) would be of great use for decision-makers.
As shown in the last subsection, we have already included the twelve pillars from
the Global Competitiveness Index in our SFA model. So in theory, we should be able
to identify the policy fields that correlate with technical (in-)efficiency. This exercise,
however, will not provide us with the answers we want to give: First, it will only tell us
something about technical efficiency scores but not about TFP growth and its components.
Second, the twelve variables have been tailored in such a way that they necessarily impose
a considerable multicollinearity problem so that the individual coefficients can hardly
be interpreted in a meaningful manner. And finally, including these twelve variables is
somewhat arbitrary as – in the absence of a theoretical model – any number of possible
determinants could be included (e. g. instead of the twelve pillars, their >100 subindices).
This is what Brock and Durlauf (2001) call “open-endedness” of economic theory.
Hence, the inclusion of the twelve pillars in the SFA model lets us get rid of the method-
ological problems outlined in the last subsection, but it will not help us in truly identifying
what – apart from capital and labor – drives economic growth. This issue is much more
of a model selection problem which we will tackle in the next section.
3.3 Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART)
Economic variables – especially those for which we lack sound theoretical models – tend
to be regressed on a potentially endless number of covariates. Only the capacities of
statistical offices set a limit to what we could throw into our estimation equations. Un-
fortunately though, as already apprehended in the last subsection, such approaches come
with enormous econometric problems as multicollinearity and nonlinearities will become
unmanageable as the number of variables increases. For instance, we would have wished
to include squared terms in Equation 4 in order to capture (inverse) u-shaped relation-
ships that have been described in the literature (see Section 2.2); however, the resulting
maximum likelihood functions quickly get out of control. Hence, we need an approach
that is capable of dealing with potentially complex and highly nonlinear relationships.
The complexity drives us into the realm of machine learning; the sketchiness of functional
relationships leads us to Bayesian statistics. Both combined give us BART.
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BART is a Bayesian nonparametric estimation technique. It was first introduced by
Chipman et al. (2010) and is based on the idea of regression trees. Regression trees are
tools to estimate y as a function of p predictors. The estimation procedure is based on the
recursive partitioning of the p dimensional predictor space in such a way that observations
assigned to the same partition are as similar as possible but preferably much different from
those in other partitions. At each stage of the regression tree, the procedure will set a
splitting rule x ≤ c (where x is a variable from the set of predictors and c is a threshold)
according to some formal criteria (e. g. what split will decrease the sum of squared errors
the most) and thereby divide the predictor space into two partitions that can again be
split into two partitions and so on. Splitting will continue until further splitting would
not increase the quality of the prediction. The final result can be displayed in the shape
of a decision tree as shown in Figure 13. The terminal nodes (i. e. the “leaves”) contain
the predictions of y in their respective partitions.
Figure 13
Example of a regression tree
no yes
no yes
x1 ≤ c1
x2 ≤ c2
E(y) = µ3E(y) = µ2
E(y) = µ1
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In order to further increase the quality of the prediction, it has become standard not to
rely on one particular tree but to grow a number of trees and to combine the knowledge
they have generated. Such ensemble-of-trees approaches can rely simply on averaging over
a set of trees using bagging algorithms (see, e. g., Breiman (1996)). The main challenge is
hereby to eliminate the influence of particular trees on the overall result and to prevent
overfitting. This can be achieved by more complex aggregation mechanisms (like gradient
boosting; see e. g. Friedman (2001)). BART solves the problem by using regularization
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priors to keep the influence of individual trees low. Formally, BART can be described as
follows:4
Y = f(X) + ε =
m∑
j=1
g(X,Tj,Mj) (6)
The functional relationship between X and Y is approximated via a sum over m trees.
Each of the trees is characterized by a tree structure Tj including the depth of the tree, the
number of nodes, the splitting rules etc. and the vector of terminal node parametersMj =
{µ1,j, ..., µb,j} which contains the predictions for Y . Equation 6 by itself is not BART-
specific as it depicts the logic behind many ensemble-of-trees methods. The interesting
detail is how BART generates the m trees: First, it sequentially grows m shallow trees
by randomly picking the variables and thresholds for the respective splitting rules within
a special MCMC sampling algorithm. Priors control that the trees do not grow too deep
as individual trees must not be allowed to influence the overall result too strongly. When
this is done, BART iteratively generates alternative proposals to the tree structure in
multiple rounds. Besides gradually improving the fit of the model to the data, this also
allows statistical inference.
What is appealing about BART is the underlying prior structure that ensures very sta-
ble and robust tree ensembles. What is most interesting for our purpose, however, is the
straightforward way to identify relevant predictors: Those variables that have frequently
been chosen for splitting during the MCMC iterations and have therefore proven to in-
crease the prediction quality, are obviously the most relevant predictors. The decision
to consider a variable xi relevant, therefore, depends on its respective inclusion propor-
tion, i. e. the share of the overall number of conducted splits that xi was involved in.
Bleich et al. (2014) have proposed thresholds which variables’ inclusion proportions have
to exceed in order to be identified as relevant predictors. Those thresholds are based on
BART being applied to the original set of predictors and a permuted response vector to
destroy the actual relationship with the predictors. These permutations then yield null
distributions. A variable must exceed the 1 − α quantile of its own null distribution in
order to be considered relevant; this is what Bleich et al. (2014) call local procedure. The
much stricter global max procedure requires variables to beat the respective quantile of the
distribution of maxima across all permutations. The global SE procedure is a compromise
between both variants using means and standard deviations of the null distributions.
4 See also the tutorial paper by Tan and Roy (2019) from whom we adopt the notation.
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We will use all three procedures and analyze only those indicators from the Global
Competitiveness Report in depth that will have proven to be relevant for TFP growth.
4 Results
We will present our results according to the structure of the last section. Hence, we will
first show the SFA estimation results (described in subsection 3.1) that the TFP decom-
position is derived from (described in subsection 3.2). Finally, we will display the BART
results (described in subsection 3.3) in order to find what indicators from the Global Com-
petitiveness Report are related to TFP growth and how their contributions look like. As
the literature review in Section 2 has revealed that there may be considerable differences
between developed and emerging economies, we will run the SFA on the complete data
set as well as on two subsets excluding the top/bottom quartile according to GDP per
hour worked, respectively.
4.1 SFA estimation results
The SFA results estimated in Equations 3 and 4 are presented in Table 2.5 The upper part
contains the stochastic frontier model for ln(Yi,t); the lower part presents the inefficiency
model for ui,t. SFA diagnostics are shown at the bottom of Table 2. Before we turn to
the inefficiency results, we will first establish the shape of the frontier and conduct the
TFP decomposition.
All the variables from the translog production function are statistically significant and
show plausible signs. Capital and labor yield positive coefficients. The squared term for
labor (βll) indicates an inverse u-shaped relationship; we observe the same for capital (βkk)
only in the set of higher-income economies. As all variables are expressed as deviations
from their sample means (as in Coelli et al. (2003)), βk and βl can be directly interpreted
as the marginal effects of capital and labor; the scores of 0.30 for capital and 0.88 for
labor seem well inside the agreeable range. The positive interaction term between capital
and labor (βkl) renders both factors complements. The coefficients for the interaction
between capital and time, βkn, are negative. Recalling that these parameters go into
technical progress (CTP in Equation 5) indicates that technical progress is capital saving.
5 We use the Stata package sfpanel by Belotti et al. (2013).
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Table 2
Results from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) with “true” fixed-effects
Set of EU member states: −→ all countries high-income low-income
Frontier part - Dep. var.: ln(Yi,t)
Time (βn) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
Capital (βk) 0.304∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
Labor (βl) 0.881∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
Time2 (βnn) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Capital2 (βkk) 0.059∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
Labor2 (βll) −0.165∗∗∗ −0.527∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
Capital × Labor (βkl) 0.123∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
Capital × Time (βkn) −0.008∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
Labor × Time (βln) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
Inefficiency part - Dep. var.: ln(ui,t)
Pillar 1 (δ1) - Institutions 2.206∗∗ 2.021∗∗∗ 0.657∗
Pillar 2 (δ2) - Infrastructure −1.516∗∗ −1.658∗∗∗ −0.408
Pillar 3 (δ3) - Macroeconomic Environment— −0.979∗∗ −0.596∗∗∗ −0.405∗∗
Pillar 4 (δ4) - Health & Primary Education −2.722∗ −1.625∗∗ −2.187∗∗
Pillar 5 (δ5) - Higher Education 1.105 0.491 1.243
Pillar 6 (δ6) - Goods Market Efficiency 2.926∗ −1.078∗ 2.159∗
Pillar 7 (δ7) - Labor Market Efficiency −1.568∗∗ −0.361 −1.676∗∗
Pillar 8 (δ8) - Financial Development −0.533∗ −0.613∗∗∗ 0.121
Pillar 9 (δ9) - Technological Readiness 0.678 0.835∗∗ 0.243
Pillar 10 (δ10) - Market Size −0.133 −0.242∗ −0.112
Pillar 11 (δ11) - Business Sophistication −0.898 1.422∗∗∗ −0.954
Pillar 12 (δ12) - Innovation −1.095 −0.982∗∗ −0.552
Constant −0.513∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗ −0.234∗
σu (constant) −4.605∗∗∗ −5.604∗∗∗ −5.299∗∗∗
συ (constant) −43.919 −43.893 −43.469
σu 0.100∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
συ 2.90e-10 2.94e-10 3.64e-10
λ 3.44e+08∗∗∗ 2.06e+08∗∗∗ 1.94e+08∗∗∗
Countries (Observations): 28 (252) 21 (189) 21 (189)
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
The resulting technical efficiency scores are depicted in Figure 14. The plot shows
average efficiency scores (between 0 and 1) over the average GDP per hour of labor
(in e). The results seem to be in line with common expectations: There is a compact
cluster of old EU members with efficiency scores above 0.98 in the upper right. Most of
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the new member states (as well as Portugal and Greece) are located further to the left
and are much more diverse in terms of technical efficiency. While, e. g., the Baltic states
have achieved decent scores in the range of the old member states, countries like Greece
or Romania are much further below. Ireland scores the lowest average efficiency score.6
Figure 14
Results from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) with “true” fixed-effects
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4.2 TFP decomposition results
The SFA results will now be used to construct a measure for TFP growth and to decompose
it into changes in technical progress (CTP), technical efficiency (CTE), scale efficiency
(CSC) and allocative efficiency (CAE) as shown in Equation 5.
Figure 15 displays how TFP growth and its four components have developed over time
(the squares represent annual means). We see that the main components of TFP growth
6 The country was hit severely by the economic crisis in 2008/09 but has managed massive GDP growth
rates since 2014. The key to success was to attract international enterprises with very low corporate
tax rates. As their contribution to GDP is accounted for in Ireland but the actual production activities
remain elsewhere, the country was (technically) among the most efficient in 2017.
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Figure 15
Results from TFP decomposition
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are changes in technical progress (see panel (b)) and changes in technical efficiency (see
panel (c)); the high mean of the former delivers large and stable average contributions to
overall TFP growth, the high variation of the latter crucially determines its development
over time (see panel (a)). Mean technical efficiency growth was in decline and even
took negative values in many countries in the years after the 2008/09 crisis before it
eventually recovered. The development of TFP growth closely follows that path. Changes
in technical progress have been positive in most countries and accelerated smoothly over
time (due to the neutral part of CTP that depends only on t). Changes in scale efficiency
(panel (d)) and allocative efficiency (panel (e)) have been small and make up only for a
minor share in overall TFP growth.
A further graphical impression of the decomposition exercise is given in Figure 16.
Figure 16
TFP decomposition by country
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It confirms that TFP growth in most countries is mainly driven by changes in technical
progress and changes in technical efficiency; hence, they are the ones whose determinants
will be most interesting. We also find stark differences between old and new EU member
states: Eastern European countries have made much more technical progress; hence, their
catch-up process was driven to a considerable extent by CTP rather than by advancements
in terms of efficiency.
4.3 BART results
4.3.1 General findings
Finally, we get to analyze the results from our BART exercise in order to find the indicators
from the Global Competitiveness Report that can be related to TFP growth.7
First of all, we go through the variable selection process. Figure 17 shows the three
procedures proposed by Bleich et al. (2014). The columns on the left depict the thresh-
olds for the local procedure; the columns on the right depict the ones for the global SE
procedure. The dashed lines show the respective global max thresholds. Filled/empty
dots indicate that a variable has/has not exceeded the respective threshold.
The yield is rather disappointing. We find that only four indicators prove to be relevant
predictors for the response variables at hand. None of the 12 pillars are able to predict
neither overall TFP growth nor changes in technical efficiency. The variables do not even
manage to survive the local procedure.
We can, however, identify relevant predictors for technical progress: Pillar 9 (“Techno-
logical readiness”) easily exceeds all three thresholds; pillar 6 (“Goods market efficiency”)
survives at least the local procedure. Hence, the two variables help producing good pre-
dictions for CTP. The respective partial dependence plots are shown in Table 3.
The plots indicate that increasing scores in pillars 6 and 9 indeed predict faster technical
progress. Both results seem highly plausible as pillar 9 captures technology availability
and absorption whereas pillar 6 measures how well the goods market is regulated and is
attractive for FDI and competition.
However, two puzzling findings catch the eye: Pillar 10 (“Market size”) is chosen as a
relevant predictor for CSC. While this in itself seems very plausible, the partial dependence
plot reveals a negative effect. Hence, countries with declining access to large markets make
7 We deploy the R package bartmachine by Kapelner and Bleich (2016). All variables have been centered.
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Figure 17
Variable selection
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9 2 6 11 10 12 1 4 8 3 5 7
7
(f) Global Procedures – CTE
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 6 11 10 12 1 4 8 3 5 7
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 6 11 10 12 1 4 8 3 5 7
7
(g) Local Procedure – CSC
0.00
0.10
10 9 5 2 3 11 7 4 8 6 12 1
0.00
0.10
10 9 5 2 3 11 7 4 8 6 12 1
8
(h) Global Procedures – CSC
0.00
0.10
10 9 5 2 3 11 7 4 8 6 12 1
0.00
0.10
10 9 5 2 3 11 7 4 8 6 12 1
8
(i) Local Procedure – CAE
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 2 7 11 5 1 10 3 4 12
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 2 7 11 5 1 10 3 4 12
9
(j) Global Procedures – CAE
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 2 7 11 5 1 10 3 4 12
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 2 7 11 5 1 10 3 4 12
9
faster progress in terms of scale efficiency. Also, high scores of pillar 8 (“Financial market
development”) predict slower growth in allocative efficiency (CAE). As already discussed
in the literature section (see Section 2.2), it might be that “zombie” companies that have
easy access to loans and other kinds of financial assistance are able to stick to suboptimal
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Table 3
Partial dependence plots
TFP
growth No relevant variables identified (see Figure 17).
“Goods market “Technological readiness”
efficiency” (pillar 6) (pillar 9)
CTP -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
-0.10
0.00
12
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
13
CTE No relevant variables identified (see Figure 17).
“Market size”
(pillar 10)
CSC -0.05 0.00 0.05
-0.2
0.0
0.2
14
“Financial market
efficiency” (pillar 8)
CAE -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3
-0.4
0.0
0.2
0.4
15
Note: The vertical axis depicts the partial effects. Blue lines represent 95 % credible intervals.
production set-ups (in the sense of wrong factor combinations) over considerable periods
of time, whereas those that do not get any quick infusion are forced to make tough
(but efficient) production decisions. This explanation would require the assumption that
efficient financial markets – at least in the sense that the GCI measures this kind of
efficiency – would help hiding and keeping up with bad production decisions.
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4.3.2 Robustness check A: Higher- and lower-income economies
Interesting differences arise when we split our data set into “richer” and “poorer” economies
as described before. Figure 18 in the Appendix shows the variable selection process for
the set of higher-income economies. Pillar 12 (innovation) has now been chosen as an
additional predictor for CTP; the corresponding partial dependence plots in Table 4 (see
Appendix) show the expected positive relationship. This clearly reflects the thoughts in
the literature review in Section 2.2: While the strategy for lower-income economies is to
collect the capability to imitate and to learn how to master existing technologies, devel-
oped countries closer to the world technology frontier must truly innovate. This is why
pillar 12 is a relevant predictor for higher-income economies but not for “poorer” ones
(see Figure 19 in the Appendix).
The analysis for the set of lower-income economies shows that pillars 6 (“Goods market
efficiency”) and 9 (“Technological readiness”) are picked again for the prediction of CTP
(see Figure 19 in the Appendix); this is the most stable result in our paper. We also find
pillar 9 to be a halfway relevant predictor for changes in scale efficiency (according to the
local procedure). The partial dependence plot in Table 5 reveals the expected positive
relationship. The negative relationships between CSC and “Market size” (pillar 10) and
between CAE and “Financial market efficiency” (pillar 8) have already been observed in
the overall data set.
4.3.3 Robustness check B: 88 indicators instead of 12 pillars
The twelve pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index have been computed from more
than one hundred individual indicators. We will now check if we can sharpen our policy
implications when we use those indicators instead of the aggregated pillars. This exercise
will show what exactly needs to be improved in order to capitalize on, e. g. the observed
effect of “Technological readiness” on CTP.8
The variable selection process is shown in Figure 20 in the Appendix;9 Table 6 presents
the partial dependence plots. Concerning the positive relationships of pillar 9 and CTP,
we now learn that it is mostly the indicators 9.04 (“Individuals using internet, in %”)
8 As data availability is lower at this level, we drop indicators with missings between 2009 and 2017.
We also drop indicators that do not make sense when only EU countries are compared (as they, e. g.,
have identical trade tariffs (indicator 6.10)).
9 Due to space constraints, we only show the 20 indicators with the highest inclusion proportions.
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and 9.05 (“Fixed broadband internet subscriptions”) that have driven the results for this
pillar in the sections above. It seems straightforward that enhanced internet access and
usage are related to the technological readiness of an economy’s labor force which, in
turn, might speed up the rate of technical progress. What is also favorable for CTP is,
i. a., a high performing airline industry (indicator 2.06) and a growing life expectancy
(indicator 4.08).
Most of the remaining results have meaningful interpretations as well: “Inflation” (in-
dicator 3.03) is a relevant and negative predictor for CTE (that is strong enough to even
influence overall TFP growth). Another interesting result is that “Government debt” (in-
dicator 3.04) works as a positive predictor for allocative efficiency growth (CAE) (that is
even more noticeable in overall TFP growth). The pattern is two-staged: Those countries
that were free to increase their debt ratios at will in the aftermath of the 2008/09 cri-
sis,10 managed to achieve more favorable combinations of capital and labor and, thereby,
experienced TFP growth. Those that maintained or even reduced their 2009 debt ratio
suffered negative effects.
5 Conclusion
The identification of indicators that determine economic development has a long tradition
in the economic literature. Comprehensive knowledge about what drives growth and
productivity could be translated into helpful policy recommendations. Unfortunately
though, economic theory is somewhat “open-ended” when it comes to the choice of relevant
indicators which makes it hard to find robust results and to give clear-cut policy advice.
This paper aims at identifying relevant predictors of TFP growth in EU countries during
the recovery phase after the 2008/09 economic crisis. We proceed in three steps: First, we
estimate TFP growth by means of Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Second, we perform
a TFP growth decomposition in order to get measures for changes in technical progress
(CTP), technical efficiency (CTE), scale efficiency (CSC) and allocative efficiency (CAE).
And third, we use BART – a non-parametric Bayesian statistical learning technique – in
order to identify relevant predictors from the Global Competitiveness Reports.
10 Those were mainly countries with initially rather low debt levels. Some of them (e. g. Slovenia,
Lithuania or Croatia) more than doubled their debt ratios between 2009 and 2017.
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We find that only a handful of indicators are good predictors of how EU countries have
performed after the 2008/09 crisis. Improvements in “Technological readiness” (mainly
broadband internet access and usage) as well as “Goods market efficiency” are positively
linked to changes in technical progress (CTP). “Innovation” joins the list of relevant
predictors of CTP when only the most developed EU countries are considered. The re-
maining TFP components show less clear patterns: “Market size” is a negative predictor
for changes in scale efficiency. “Financial market efficiency” yields negative effects on
changes in allocative efficiency (CAE). The latter might be attributed to “zombie” com-
panies keeping up with inefficient production set-ups when they have easy access to loans.
The results presented in this paper can be guidelines to policymakers as they identify
areas in which further action could be taken in order to increase economic growth. Even
though it seems straightforward that broadband internet access is crucial for the tech-
nological readiness of an economy’s labor force, a lot of catching-up is necessary even in
higher-income EU economies. It is remarkable how this result stands out from the vast
number of possible indicators included in this study.
Concerning the bigger picture, it becomes obvious that advanced machine learning
techniques can not replace sound economic theory but they help separating the wheat
from the chaff when it comes to selecting the most important factors. They might be key
for the further exploration of the widely capricious phenomenon TFP.
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Cuaresma, J. C., Lábaj, M. and Pružinskỳ, P. (2014). Prospective ageing and economic growth in Europe. The Journal
of the Economics of Ageing, 3, 50–57.
Cunat, A. and Melitz, M. J. (2012). Volatility, labor market flexibility, and the pattern of comparative advantage. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 10 (2), 225–254.
Danquah, M., Moral-Benito, E. and Ouattara, B. (2014). TFP growth and its determinants: A model averaging
approach. Empirical Economics, 47 (1), 227–251.
De Gregorio, J. and Guidotti, P. E. (1995). Financial development and economic growth. World Development, 23 (3),
433–448.
Demetriades, P. O. and Hussein, K. A. (1996). Does financial development cause economic growth? Time-series evidence
from 16 countries. Journal of Development Economics, 51 (2), 387–411.
Diamond, P. A. (1965). National debt in a neoclassical growth model. The American Economic Review, 55 (5), 1126–1150.
Dima, A. M., Begu, L., Vasilescu, M. D. and Maassen, M. A. (2018). The relationship between the knowledge economy
and global competitiveness in the European Union. Sustainability, 10 (6), 1706.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117 (1), 1–37.
Doğan, İ. and Bilgili, F. (2014). The non-linear impact of high and growing government external debt on economic growth:
A markov regime-switching approach. Economic Modelling, 39, 213–220.
Donaldson, D. and Hornbeck, R. (2016). Railroads and American economic growth: A ‘market access’ approach. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2), 799–858.
Drukker, D., Gomis-Porqueras, P. and Hernandez-Verme, P. (2005). Threshold effects in the relationship between
inflation and growth: A new panel-data approach. MPRA Paper, (38225).
Durlauf, S. N., Kourtellos, A. and Tan, C. M. (2008). Are any growth theories robust? The Economic Journal,
118 (527), 329–346.
Duval, R., Hong, G. H. and Timmer, Y. (2020). Financial frictions and the great productivity slowdown. The Review of
Financial Studies, 33 (2), 475–503.
Easterly, W. and Kraay, A. (2000). Small states, small problems? Income, growth, and volatility in small states. World
Development, 28 (11), 2013–2027.
— and Levine, R. (2001). What have we learned from a decade of empirical research on growth? It’s Not Factor Accumu-
lation: Stylized Facts and Growth Models. The World Bank Economic Review, 15 (2), 177–219.
Égert, B. (2016). Regulation, institutions, and productivity: New macroeconomic evidence from OECD countries. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 106 (5), 109–13.
Égert, B., Kozluk, T. J. and Sutherland, D. (2009). Infrastructure and growth: Empirical evidence. CESifo Working
Paper Series.
Elola, A., Parrilli, M. D. and Rabellotti, R. (2013). The resilience of clusters in the context of increasing globalization:
The basque wind energy value chain. European Planning Studies, 21 (7), 989–1006.
Esfahani, H. S. and Ramírez, M. T. (2003). Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth. Journal of Development
Economics, 70 (2), 443–477.
Eurostat (2020). Intra-EU trade in goods compared with extra-EU trade in goods. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php?title=Intra-EU_trade_in_goods_-_main_features&oldid=452727#Intra-EU_
trade_in_goods_compared_with_extra-EU_trade_in_goods, accessed on Sept. 28, 2020.
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M. and Zhang, Z. (1994). Productivity growth, technical progress, and efficiency change
in industrialized countries. The American Economic Review, pp. 66–83.
Farhadi, M. (2015). Transport infrastructure and long-run economic growth in OECD countries. Transportation Research
Part A: Policy and Practice, 74, 73–90.
51
Fernald, J. G. (1999). Roads to prosperity? Assessing the link between public capital and productivity. American
Economic Review, 89 (3), 619–638.
Fernandes, A. P., Ferreira, P. and Winters, L. A. (2018). The effect of competition on executive compensation and
incentives evidence from a quasi-natural experiment. Journal of Human Resources, 53 (3), 783–824.
Fernandez, C., Ley, E. and Steel, M. F. (2001). Model uncertainty in cross-country growth regressions. Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 16 (5), 563–576.
Fischer, S. (1993). The role of macroeconomic factors in growth. Journal of monetary economics, 32 (3), 485–512.
Fitoussi, J.-P., Jestaz, D., Phelps, E. S., Zoega, G., Blanchard, O. and Sims, C. A. (2000). Roots of the recent
recoveries: Labor reforms or private sector forces? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2000 (1), 237–311.
Friedman, J. H. (2001). Greedy function approximation: A gradient boosting machine. Annals of statistics, pp. 1189–1232.
Fu, X., Pietrobelli, C. and Soete, L. (2011). The role of foreign technology and indigenous innovation in the emerging
economies: Technological change and catching-up. World Development, 39 (7), 1204–1212.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. R. and Venables, A. (1999). The spatial economy: Cities, regions, and international trade.
MIT Press.
Furman, J. L., Porter, M. E. and Stern, S. (2002). The determinants of national innovative capacity. Research Policy,
31 (6), 899–933.
Gaddis, I. andKlasen, S. (2014). Economic development, structural change, and women’s labor force participation. Journal
of Population Economics, 27 (3), 639–681.
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J. and Sturgeon, T. (2005). The governance of global value chains. Review of International
Political Economy, 12 (1), 78–104.
Ghani, E., Goswami, A. G. and Kerr, W. R. (2016). Highway to success: The impact of the Golden Quadrilateral project
for the location and performance of Indian manufacturing. The Economic Journal, 126 (591), 317–357.
— and Suri, V. (1999). Productivity growth, capital accumulation, and the banking sector-some lessons from Malaysia.
Tech. rep., The World Bank.
Gilbert Jr, A. H., Pick, R. A. and Ward, S. G. (2012). Does ‘it doesn’t matter’ matter?: A study of innovation and
information systems issues. Review of Business Information Systems (RBIS), 16 (4), 177–186.
Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? Journal of
Economic Growth, 9 (3), 271–303.
Glass, A. J. and Saggi, K. (1999). FDI policies under shared factor markets. Journal of International Economics, 49 (2),
309–332.
Goldberg, I., Branstetter, L., Goddard, J. G. and Kuriakose, S. (2008). Globalization and technology absorption in
Europe and Central Asia: the role of trade, FDI, and cross-border knowledge flows. The World Bank.
Goldstein, A. (2004). Regional Integration, FDI and Competitiveness in Southern Africa. OECD Pubslishing.
Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Özcan, Ş., Karabarbounis, L. and Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2017). Capital allocation and pro-
ductivity in South Europe. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132 (4), 1915–1967.
Gordon, R. J. (2017). The rise and fall of American growth: The US standard of living since the civil war, vol. 70.
Princeton University Press.
Gramlich, E. M. (1994). Infrastructure investment: A review essay. Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (3), 1176–1196.
Greene, W. (2005). Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the stochastic frontier model. Journal of
Econometrics, 126 (2), 269–303.
Gretton, P., Gali, J. and Parham, D. (2004). The effects of ICTs and complementary innovations on Australian produc-
tivity growth. In The Economic Impact of ICT: Measurement, Evidence and Implications, OECD, pp. 105–130.
Griffith, R., Harrison, R. and Simpson, H. (2010). Product market reform and innovation in the EU. Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 112 (2), 389–415.
—, Huergo, E., Mairesse, J. and Peters, B. (2006). Innovation and productivity across four European countries. Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 22 (4), 483–498.
—, Redding, S. and Reenen, J. V. (2004). Mapping the two faces of R&D: Productivity growth in a panel of OECD
industries. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86 (4), 883–895.
Griliches, Z. (1958). Research costs and social returns: Hybrid corn and related innovations. Journal of Political Economy,
66 (5), 419–431.
Gros, D. (2013). Foreign debt versus domestic debt in the Euro area. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 29 (3), 502–517.
Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1991). Innovation and growth in the global economy. MIT Press.
Gruber, T. (2004). Employment and labor market flexibility in the new EU member states. Focus on European Economic
Integration, 4 (1), 96–121.
Guadalupe, M., Kuzmina, O. and Thomas, C. (2012). Innovation and foreign ownership. American Economic Review,
102 (7), 3594–3627.
Guerguil, M., Mandon, P. and Tapsoba, R. (2017). Flexible fiscal rules and countercyclical fiscal policy. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 52, 189–220.
Gupta, S., Malhotra, N. K., Czinkota, M. and Foroudi, P. (2016). Marketing innovation: A consequence of competi-
tiveness. Journal of Business Research, 69 (12), 5671–5681.
Haaland, J. I. and Wooton, I. (2007). Domestic labor markets and foreign direct investment. Review of International
Economics, 15 (3), 462–480.
Hall, B. H., Lotti, F. and Mairesse, J. (2013). Evidence on the impact of R&D and ICT investments on innovation and
productivity in Italian firms. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 22 (3), 300–328.
52
Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (1), 83–116.
Hamermesh, D. S. and Trejo, S. J. (2000). The demand for hours of labor: Direct evidence from California. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 82 (1), 38–47.
Hanushek, E. A. (2016). Will more higher education improve economic growth? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 32 (4),
538–552.
— and Kimko, D. D. (2000). Schooling, labor-force quality, and the growth of nations. American Economic Review, 90 (5),
1184–1208.
— and Wößmann, L. (2007). Education Quality and Economic Growth. The World Bank Group.
Haskel, J. E., Pereira, S. C. and Slaughter, M. J. (2007). Does inward foreign direct investment boost the productivity
of domestic firms? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89 (3), 482–496.
Henderson, J., Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N. and Yeung, H. W.-C. (2002). Global production networks and the analysis
of economic development. Review of International Political Economy, 9 (3), 436–464.
Holmes, T. J. and Schmitz, J. A. (2010). Competition and productivity: A review of evidence. Annual Review of Eco-
nomics, 2 (1), 619–642.
Hopenhayn, H. and Rogerson, R. (1993). Job turnover and policy evaluation: A general equilibrium analysis. Journal of
Political Economy, 101 (5), 915–938.
Hornung, E. (2015). Railroads and growth in Prussia. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13 (4), 699–736.
Humphrey, J. and Schmitz, H. (2002). How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial clusters?
Regional Studies, 36 (9), 1017–1027.
Islam, N., Dai, E. and Sakamoto, H. (2006). Role of TFP in China’s Growth. Asian Economic Journal, 20 (2), 127–159.
Javorcik, B., Iacovone, L. and Fitrani, F. (2015). Trade Integration, FDI, and Productivity. Tech. rep., World Bank,
Jakarta.
Javorcik, B. S. (2004). Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In search of spillovers
through backward linkages. American Economic Review, 94 (3), 605–627.
Jha, S., Mallick, S. K., Park, D. and Quising, P. F. (2014). Effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy: Evidence from
developing Asia. Journal of Macroeconomics, 40, 82–98.
Kapelner, A. and Bleich, J. (2016). bartMachine: Machine Learning with Bayesian Additive Regression Trees. Journal
of Statistical Software, 70, 1–40.
Kaplinsky, R. (2000). Globalisation and unequalisation: What can be learned from value chain analysis? Journal of
Development Studies, 37 (2), 117–146.
Kim, S. and Han, G. (2001). A decomposition of total factor productivity growth in Korean manufacturing industries: A
stochastic frontier approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 16 (3), 269–281.
King, R. G. and Levine, R. (1993a). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
108 (3), 717–737.
— and — (1993b). Finance, entrepreneurship and growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32 (3), 513–542.
Kirikkaleli, D. and Ozun, A. (2019). Innovation capacity, business sophistication and macroeconomic stability: Empirical
evidence from OECD countries. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 20 (2), 351–367.
Kluge, J. (2018). Sectoral diversification as insurance against economic instability. Journal of Regional Science, 58 (1),
204–223.
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative institu-
tional measures. Economics & Politics, 7 (3), 207–227.
Krugman, P. (1991a). Geography and trade. MIT Press.
— (1991b). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy, 99 (3), 483–499.
— (1994). Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession. Foreign Affairs, 73 (2), 28–44.
Kumbhakar, S. C., Denny, M. and Fuss, M. (2000). Estimation and decomposition of productivity change when production
is not efficient: a paneldata approach. Econometric Reviews, 19 (4), 312–320.
— and Lovell, C. K. (2003). Stochastic frontier analysis. Cambridge University Press.
— and Wang, H.-J. (2005). Estimation of growth convergence using a stochastic production frontier approach. Economics
Letters, 88 (3), 300–305.
Lall, S. (2001). Competitiveness Indices and Developing Countries: An Economic Evaluation of the Global Competitiveness
Report. World Development, 29 (9), 1501–1525.
Latruffe, L. (2010). Competitiveness, productivity and efficiency in the agricultural and agri-food sectors. Tech. rep.,
OECD.
Laurenceson, J. and O’Donnell, C. (2014). New estimates and a decomposition of provincial productivity change in
China. China Economic Review, 30, 86–97.
Lechman, E. and Kaur, H. (2015). Economic Growth and Female Labor Force Participation-Verifying the U-feminization
Hypothesis: New Evidence for 162 Countries over the Period 1990-2012. Economics & Sociology, 8 (1), 246–257.
Lee, K. and Kang, S.-M. (2007). Innovation types and productivity growth: Evidence from Korean manufacturing firms.
Global Economic Review, 36 (4), 343–359.
Lee, S. and Connolly, D. J. (2010). The impact of it news on hospitality firm value using cumulative abnormal returns
(cars). International Journal of Hospitality Management, 29 (3), 354–362.
Levine, R. (2004). Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
— and Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 88 (3), 537–358.
53
Ley, E. and Steel, M. F. (2009). On the effect of prior assumptions in bayesian model averaging with applications to
growth regression. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24 (4), 651–674.
Lichtenberg, F. R. (1995). The output contributions of computer equipment and personnel: A firm-level analysis. Eco-
nomics of Innovation and New Technology, 3 (3-4), 201–218.
Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 22 (1), 3–42.
MacDonald, J. M. (1994). Does import competition force efficient production? The Review of Economics and Statistics,
pp. 721–727.
Madsen, J. B. and Ang, J. B. (2016). Finance-led growth in the OECD since the nineteenth century: How does financial
development transmit to growth? Review of Economics and Statistics, 98 (3), 552–572.
Mansfield, E. (1965). Rates of return from industrial research and development. The American Economic Review, 55 (1/2),
310–322.
Markusen, J. R. (2002). Multinational firms and the theory of international trade. MIT Press.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3), 681–712.
Meeusen, W. and van Den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas production functions with com-
posed error. International Economic Review, pp. 435–444.
Melitz, M. J. and Ottaviano, G. I. (2008). Market size, trade, and productivity. The Review of Economic Studies, 75 (1),
295–316.
Melo, P. C., Graham, D. J. and Brage-Ardao, R. (2013). The productivity of transport infrastructure investment: A
meta-analysis of empirical evidence. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 43 (5), 695–706.
Mincer, J. (1958). Investment in human capital and personal income distribution. Journal of Political Economy, 66 (4),
281–302.
Moral-Benito, E. (2012). Determinants of economic growth: A Bayesian panel data approach. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 94 (2), 566–579.
Morrison, A., Pietrobelli, C. and Rabellotti, R. (2008). Global value chains and technological capabilities: a framework
to study learning and innovation in developing countries. Oxford Development Studies, 36 (1), 39–58.
Mortensen, D. T. and Pissarides, C. A. (1994). Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. The
Review of Economic Studies, 61 (3), 397–415.
Mundell, R. A. (1965). Growth, stability, and inflationary finance. Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), 97–109.
Murnane, R. J., Willett, J. B., Duhaldeborde, Y. and Tyler, J. H. (2000). How important are the cognitive skills of
teenagers in predicting subsequent earnings? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 19 (4), 547–568.
Nickell, S. (1997). Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 11 (3), 55–74.
Nickell, S. J. (1996). Competition and corporate performance. Journal of Political Economy, 104 (4), 724–746.
Nicoletti, G. and Scarpetta, S. (2003). Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD evidence. Economic Policy, 18 (36),
9–72.
North, D. C. (1987). Institutions, transaction costs and economic growth. Economic Inquiry, 25 (3), 419–428.
— (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.
Omay, T. and Kan, E. Ö. (2010). Re-examining the threshold effects in the inflation–growth nexus with cross-sectionally
dependent non-linear panel: Evidence from six industrialized economies. Economic Modelling, 27 (5), 996–1005.
Orea, L. (2002). Parametric decomposition of a generalized Malmquist productivity index. Journal of Productivity Analysis,
18 (1), 5–22.
Ortega-Argilés, R., Potters, L. and Vivarelli, M. (2011). R&D and productivity: Testing sectoral peculiarities using
micro data. Empirical Economics, 41 (3), 817–839.
Papageorgiou, C. (2003). Distinguishing between the effects of primary and post-primary education on economic growth.
Review of Development Economics, 7 (4), 622–635.
Pegkas, P., Staikouras, C. and Tsamadias, C. (2019). Does research and development expenditure impact innovation?
Evidence from the European Union countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 41 (5), 1005–1025.
Peluffo, A. (2015). Foreign direct investment, productivity, demand for skilled labour and wage inequality: An analysis
of Uruguay. The World Economy, 38 (6), 962–983.
Pilat, D. (2005). The ICT productivity paradox: Insights from micro data. OECD Economic Studies, 2004 (1), 37–65.
Pires, J. O. and Garcia, F. (2012). Productivity of nations: a stochastic frontier approach to TFP decomposition.
Economics Research International, 2012.
Pissarides, C. A. (1998). The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; the role of unemployment
benefits and tax structure. European Economic Review, 42 (1), 155–183.
Porter, M. E. (1990). The competitive advantage of nations. Harvard Business Review, 68 (2), 73–93.
Prettner, K. (2013). Population aging and endogenous economic growth. Journal of Population Economics, 26 (2),
811–834.
Qosasi, A., Maulina, E., Purnomo, M., Muftiadi, A., Permana, E. and Febrian, F. (2019). The impact of information
and communication technology capability on the competitive advantage of small businesses. International Journal of
Technology, 10 (1), 167–177.
Ramondo, N., Rodríguez-Clare, A. and Saborío-Rodríguez, M. (2016). Trade, domestic frictions, and scale effects.
American Economic Review, 106 (10), 3159–84.
Razavi, S. M., Ghasemi, R., Abdullahi, B. and Shafie, H. (2012). Relationship between innovation and business so-
phistication: a secondary analysis of countries global competitiveness. European Journal of Scientific Research, 79 (1),
54
29–39.
Redding, S. J. and Turner, M. (2014). Transportation costs and the spatial organization of economic activity. NBER
Working Paper, No. 20235.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2010). Growth in a time of debt. American Economic Review, 100 (2), 573–78.
Rioja, F. and Valev, N. (2004). Does one size fit all?: a reexamination of the finance and growth relationship. Journal of
Development Economics, 74 (2), 429–447.
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and
integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2), 131–165.
Röller, L.-H. and Waverman, L. (2001). Telecommunications infrastructure and economic development: A simultaneous
approach. American Economic Review, 91 (4), 909–923.
Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy, 94 (5), 1002–1037.
— (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5, Part 2), S71–S102.
Rose, A. K. (2006). Size really doesn’t matter: In search of a national scale effect. NBER Working Paper, (12191).
Sahlberg, P. (2006). Education reform for raising economic competitiveness. Journal of Educational Change, 7 (4), 259–
287.
Saint-Paul, G. (1992). Fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (4),
1243–1259.
— (1997). Is labour rigidity harming Europe’s competitiveness? The effect of job protection on the pattern of trade and
welfare. European Economic Review, 41 (3-5), 499–506.
Sala-i-Martin, X., Doppelhofer, G. and Miller, R. I. (2004). Determinants of long-term growth: A Bayesian averaging
of classical estimates (BACE) approach. American Economic Review, pp. 813–835.
Scarpetta, S. and Tressel, T. (2002). Productivity and convergence in a panel of OECD industries: Do regulations and
institutions matter? Tech. rep., OECD Economics Working Paper.
Schivardi, F., Sette, E. and Tabellini, G. (2017). Credit misallocation during the European financial crisis. BIS Working
Papers, 669.
Schmidt, P. (2011). One-step and two-step estimation in SFA models. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 36 (2), 201–203.
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in human capital. The American economic review, pp. 1–17.
Schumpeter, J. (1961). The Theory of Economic Development. English translation by Redvers Opie. Oxford University
Press, New York.
See, K. F. and Coelli, T. (2013). Estimating and decomposing productivity growth of the electricity generation industry
in Malaysia: A stochastic frontier analysis. Energy Policy, 62, 207–214.
Shan, J. Z., Morris, A. G. and Sun, F. (2001). Financial development and economic growth: An egg-and-chicken problem?
Review of International Economics, 9 (3), 443–454.
Solow, R. M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. The Review of Economics and Statistics,
pp. 312–320.
— (1987). We’d better watch out. New York Times Book Review, 36.
Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 (3), 355–374.
Syverson, C. (2004). Market structure and productivity: A concrete example. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (6),
1181–1222.
Tan, Y. V. and Roy, J. (2019). Bayesian additive regression trees and the General BART model. Statistics in Medicine,
38 (25), 5048–5069.
Temple, J. (1999). A positive effect of human capital on growth. Economics Letters, 65 (1), 131–134.
Välilä, T. (2020). Infrastructure and growth: A survey of macro-econometric research. Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics, 53, 39–49.
van der Straaten, K., Pisani, N. and Kolk, A. (2019). Unraveling the MNE wage premium. Journal of International
Business Studies, pp. 1–36.
Vickers, J. (1995). Concepts of competition. Oxford Economic Papers, pp. 1–23.
World Economic Forum (2017). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017–2018. Tech. rep.
World Economic Forum (2019). Macroeconomic environment. http://reports.weforum.org/
global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/macroeconomic-environment/, accessed on 2019-05-07.
Zang, H. and Kim, Y. C. (2007). Does financial development precede growth? Robinson and Lucas might be right. Applied
Economics Letters, 14 (1), 15–19.
55
6 Appendix
Figure 18
Variable selection – set of higher-income economies
(a) Local Procedure – TFP growth
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 11 12 10 6 1 8 5 3 4 7
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 11 12 10 6 1 8 5 3 4 7
16
(b) Global Procedures – TFP growth
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 11 12 10 6 1 8 5 3 4 7
0.00
0.10
0.20
9 2 11 12 10 6 1 8 5 3 4 7
16
(c) Local Procedure – CTP
.0
0.10
9 6 12 8 1 3 11 5 2 7 4 10
0.00
0.10
9 6 12 8 1 3 11 5 2 7 4 10
17
(d) Global Procedures – CTP
.0
0.10
9 6 12 8 1 3 11 5 2 7 4 10
0.00
0.10
9 6 12 8 1 3 11 5 2 7 4 10
17
(e) Local Procedure – CTE
0.00
0.10
10 9 12 11 1 5 2 6 8 3 4 7
0.00
0.10
10 9 12 11 1 5 2 6 8 3 4 7
18
(f) Global Procedures – CTE
0.00
0.10
10 9 12 11 1 5 2 6 8 3 4 7
0.00
0.10
10 9 12 11 1 5 2 6 8 3 4 7
18
(g) Local Procedure – CSC
0.00
0.10
10 5 11 9 6 1 2 3 12 8 7 4
0.00
0.10
10 5 11 9 6 1 2 3 12 8 7 4
19
(h) Global Procedures – CSC
0.00
0.10
10 5 11 9 6 1 2 3 12 8 7 4
0.00
0.10
10 5 11 9 6 1 2 3 12 8 7 4
19
(i) Local Procedure – CAE
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 5 2 7 3 4 12 10 1 11
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 5 2 7 3 4 12 10 1 11
20
(j) Global Procedures – CAE
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 5 2 7 3 4 12 10 1 11
0.00
0.10
8 6 9 5 2 7 3 4 12 10 1 11
20
56
Figure 19
Variable selection – set of lower-income economies
(a) Local Procedure – TFP growth
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Table 4
Partial dependence plots – set of higher-income economies
TFP
growth No relevant variables identified (see Figure 18).
“Goods market efficiency” “Technological readiness” “Innovation”
(pillar 6) (pillar 9) (pillar 12)
CTP -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.15
-0.2
0.0
0.2
26
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
27
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
28
CTE No relevant variables identified (see Figure 18).
CSC No relevant variables identified (see Figure 18).
“Financial market”
efficiency (pillar 8)
CAE -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.4
0.0
0.4
29
Note: The vertical axis depicts the partial effects. Blue lines represent 95 % credible intervals.
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Table 5
Partial dependence plots – set of lower-income economies
TFP
growth No relevant variables identified (see Figure 19).
“Goods market efficiency” “Technological readiness”
(pillar 6) (pillar 9)
CTP -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
-0.10
0.00
0.10
30
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
31
CTE No relevant variables identified (see Figure 19).
“Technological readiness” “Market size”
(pillar 9) (pillar 10)
CSC -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
0.15
32
-0.05 0.00 0.05
-0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
33
“Financial market
efficiency” (pillar 8)
CAE -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
34
Note: The vertical axis depicts the partial effects. Blue lines represent 95 % credible intervals.
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Figure 20
Variable selection – indicators
(a) Local Procedure – TFP growth
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(b) Global Procedures – TFP growth
0.00
0.04
0.08
03
03
03
04
02
05
07
01
06
11
10
04
02
02
07
02
12
06
01
11
06
16
11
08
06
15
02
01
09
03
04
03
03
01
01
07
08
07
08
04
0.00
0.04
0.08
03
03
03
04
02
05
07
01
06
11
10
04
02
02
07
02
12
06
01
11
06
16
11
08
06
15
02
01
09
03
04
03
03
01
01
07
08
07
08
04
35
(c) Local Procedure – CTP
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(d) Global Procedures – CTP
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(e) Local Procedure – CTE
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(f) Global Procedures – CTE
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(g) Local Procedure – CSC
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(h) Global Procedures – CSC
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(i) Local Procedure – CAE
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(j) Global Procedures – CAE
0.00
0.03
0.06
03
04
02
07
10
01
01
08
03
03
01
15
06
16
01
10
06
11
01
12
07
02
04
09
10
04
09
04
10
02
01
13
07
07
06
14
11
06
05
04
0.00
0.03
0.06
03
04
02
07
10
01
01
08
03
03
01
15
06
16
01
10
06
11
01
12
07
02
04
09
10
04
09
04
10
02
01
13
07
07
06
14
11
06
05
04
39
60
Table 6
Partial dependence plots – indicators
3.03: Inflation, in % 3.04: General government
debt (in % of GDP)
2.05: Quality of air trans-
port infrastructure, 1-7
TFP
growth
-2 -1 0 1 2
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
40
-20 -10 0 10
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
41
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
42
2.06: Available airline seat
km/week
4.08: Life expectancy
(in years)
9.05: Fixed broadb. inter-
net subscript. / 100 pop.
9.04: Individuals using in-
ternet, in %
-100 0 100 200
-0.02
0.02
0.06
43
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
-0.04
0.00
0.04
44
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
-0.03
0.00
0.02
0.04
45
-10 -5 0 5
-0.04
-0.01
0.01
0.03
46
6.09: Prevalence of trade
barriers, 1-7
2.09: Fixed telephone lines
/ 100 pop.
5.01: Secondary education
enrollment, in %
1.11: Eff. of legal framew.
in challeng. regs., 1-7
CTP -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
47
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
-0.02
0.00
0.02
48
-10 -5 0 5 10
-0.01
0.01
49
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.02
0.00
0.02
50
3.03: Inflation, in %
CTE -2 -1 0 1 2
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
51
10.02: Foreign market size
index, 1-7
2.06: Available airline seat
km/week
7.02: Flexibility of wage
determination, 1-7
12.04: University-industry
collaboration in R&D, 1-7
CSC -0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10
-0.10
0.00
0.10
52
-100 0 100 200
-0.15
-0.05
0.05
53
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.10
0.00
0.10
54
-0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
-0.10
0.00
0.10
55
3.04: General government
debt (in % of GDP)
2.07: Quality of electricity
supply, 1-7
10.01: Domestic market
size index, 1-7
1.08: Wastefulness of gov-
ernment spending, 1-7
CAE -20 -10 0 10
-0.2
0.0
0.2
56
-0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
57
-0.05 0.00 0.05
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
58
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
59
Note: The vertical axis depicts the partial effects. Blue lines represent 95 % credible intervals.
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